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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PROTECTED RATHER THAN PROTRACTED
 
2 \ 
This Paper reviews the current state of the art on the return of displaced per-
sons as a durable solution for long-term displacement situations. It outlines 
the impact, challenges and actors involved in the return process. The Paper 
shows that present understandings of return, protracted situations and con-
flict are often too short-sighted and need to be revised and extended. Reinte-
gration as part of the return process in particular has only received little at-
tention until now. The Paper further demonstrates that the relationship between 
displacement, return and peace has not yet been fully understood. More field 
and comparative research is needed that includes the perspectives of the dis-
placed themselves to fully comprehend the process of return and to be able to 
identify best practices to guarantee the sustainability of return and reintegration. 
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concept of post-conflict needs to be broadened to in-
clude those situations that continues to experience 
significant levels of violence. In order to analyse and 
respond adequately to protracted conflict situations, 
it is necessary to overcome the classical division be-
tween pre-, actual, and post-conflict situations and 
recognise the cyclical re-emergence of conflict. 
Return is a process rather than the end 
of a cycle
First, return does not mean that displaced persons 
necessarily go back to the exact same place from 
which they have fled. Second, although return is often 
considered to be “the end of one cycle”, it is rather a 
new beginning: that of reintegration. Third, due to the 
principle of non-refoulement, returnees are guaran-
teed voluntary return. Yet, displaced persons may have 
no desire to return, because (i) they belong to a minor-
ity group that still risks certain forms of harassment 
and discrimination, (ii) the degree of destruction in 
the place of origin is so large that opportunities to se-
cure a livelihood are minimal or non-existent, (iii) the 
circumstances that originally led to their forced exit 
were too traumatic, (iv) they lack capital, (v) they have 
close ethnic ties within the host society, or (vi) have 
better access to livelihood opportunities in the host 
area.
The preconditions for  
sustainable return are of a political,  
legal, economic and social nature
Sustainability of return depends on the capability 
of governments to frame the legal conditions for re-
solving land disputes and inequalities that preceded 
displacement, guarantee justice and make perpetra-
tors accountable. Opportunities to successfully re-
build one’s livelihood play a decisive role for a dis-
placed person’s decision to return and to stay. Other 
factors, such as the level of emotional attachment, 
the actual degree of rule of law, assets and resources, 
and the quality of reconciliation in the area of return 
are also crucial. Competition for scarce resources as 
well as inter-group tensions is one highly important 
factor.  
The pressing issue of long-term  
displacement
Many of the persons affected by forced displace-
ment today find themselves in so-called protracted refu-
gee situations (PRS), where refugees have been displaced 
for over five years and their situation is characterised 
by particular challenges: private hosts have to shoul-
der additional financial burdens, host states and the 
countries of origin often face diplomatic tensions, al-
ternative livelihoods and international assistance 
shrink over time, while levels of crime, insecurity, do-
mestic or gender-based violence and other security 
concerns, such as rising intercommunal or interethnic 
tensions, increase. To not prolong these situations of 
protracted forced displacement, they need to be ad-
dressed and solutions must be found. The failure to ad-
dress situations of protracted forced displacement may 
undermine the stability of peace processes.
Internally displaced persons are in a 
particularly vulnerable position
Contrary to refugees, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) remain in the territory of the state whose in-
stitutions were unable to prevent their displacement 
and that often could not guarantee their safety. Con-
trary to refugees, IDPs do not benefit from specific le-
gal protections even though they are exposed to al-
most identical risks. The Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement of 1998 that clarify the condi-
tions of return (voluntarily, in safety and dignity), the 
role of the state (help to ensure full participation of 
IDPs, assist in recovery of former properties or ensure 
compensations), and the role of international organi-
sations (should have access to assist in return and re-
integration) are not legally binding. To include the 
role of IDPs in the analysis, we speak of situations of 
protracted forced displacement (PFD) instead of PRS. 
 
Conflict is fluid
Conflict situations do not pass directly into 
post-conflict situations, but undergo a transition 
without clear-cut boundaries. Consequently, the 
Main Findings
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can be included in the various stages of peace pro-
cesses to make a difference. The oscillation of DPs be-
tween the statuses of IDP, refugee, returnee, or dis-
placed returnee, has not been addressed sufficiently. 
Consequently, more research in this area is needed. A 
clarification of the link between return and peace in 
general could yield significant insights for practices 
that help end PFD. 
Conflict and displacement can change 
gender roles
Women who flee without their husbands may re-
sume more responsibilities and diversify their activi-
ties in their host communities. This might have a 
positive impact on the economic situation, personal 
freedom, and social independence of women while 
men may have difficulties to live up to their social 
role as breadwinners. This change in gender relations 
as well as age, i.e. the specific needs and resiliencies 
of elderly persons and children, both decisive factors 
that define the vulnerability of individuals in PFD, 
have to be taken into account as not to challenge the 
success and sustainability of reintegration.
There are three interlinked sources of 
insecurity in regard to return
1\ security situation of displaced persons in the 
host region; 
2\ security situation during passage and
3\ security situation once the displaced persons 
have returned. 
These three are often interlinked and cannot al-
ways be clearly separated. Forcing displaced persons 
to return—out of fear of insecurity in the host re-
gion—before conflict has subsided in their home re-
gion, may re-ignite conflict and consequently gener-
ate new waves of refugees; preventing sustainable 
return and reintegration. This desk review, further-
more, demonstrates that the exclusion of displaced 
people, local communities, ethnic or political groups 
can lead to renewed tensions and risk the stability of 
peace.  
Is the participation of displaced per-
sons in peace processes a crucial factor 
for their sustainable reintegration?
Although scholars have already argued that dis-
placement and peace might be interlinked, it is still 
unknown under which conditions and to what de-
gree it is necessary to ensure the participation of DPs 
in peace processes for the sustainability of peace and 
return in general. Additionally, it is not clear how DPs 
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Resiliencies and the livelihood-making 
of displaced persons
A complete analysis clarifying the DP’s prospec-
tive ability to benefit from the access, ownership and 
user rights to livelihood resources like land, water, 
and shelter would be beneficial for each situation of 
PFD and subsequent return programming. Moreover, 
including donors and implementing stakeholders 
could provide further insights into the challenges 
and risks of PFDs and return processes.
Comprehensive displacement  
approach
A comprehensive approach to PFD situations in-
cluding IDPs, refugees, persons in refugee-like situa-
tions under the common category of displaced per-
sons (DPs), and host communities is needed. 
Moreover, perspectives and voices from the DPs and 
local stakeholders should be included in the analysis.
Role of displaced persons in peace  
processes
In how far does the inclusion of DPs in peace ne-
gotiations and agreements contribute to the stability 
of peace processes? Under what conditions does the 
participation of DPs in peace processes contribute to 
the sustainability of return? Other open questions 
are related to representation, i.e. who speaks for DPs, 
or to the differences between first, second, or multi-
ple displacements. Are DPs and the issue of their in-
clusion in peace processes furthermore constrained 
by their assumed disadvantaged position as DPs ver-
sus a majority society in the host or homeland? It 
might be worth exploring contract research and ne-
gotiation theories to improve the prospects of success 
and sustainability of peace processes.
Potentials of displaced persons
All too often DPs are perceived as problematic, 
negative and a burden both for host communities/
countries and the international donor community 
alike. Yet the influx of DPs has been observed to be an 
impetus for development: the labour market profits 
from qualified staff, the economy profits from inno-
vations, diversification, and an expansion of trade 
that comes along with the influx of DPs. In their 
home countries, attitudes that DPs have acquired in 
exile, e.g. the empowerment of women, expectations 
towards the government and understanding of the 
significance of the rule of law, are important assets 
that could potentially be tapped in a more targeted 
way during peace processes.
Points to Observe when Conducting 
Future Research
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Take a comprehensive and  
co-ordinated approach
In order to strengthen displaced persons in peace 
processes, an approach is required that includes mul-
tidimensional, multilateral, inter-institutional and 
transregional aspects, and that incorporates the host 
country and the country of origin as well as geopoliti-
cal dimensions. Sustainable projects have to acknowl-
edge positive impacts of hosting DP communities, 
such as economic growth, the diversification of liveli-
hoods, dynamical adaptation processes, and social 
development.
Bring relief and development efforts 
together to achieve sustainable  pro-
tracted forced displacement policies
Often, PFD situations are approached through 
short-term interventions like quick impact projects 
(QIPs) and emergency relief projects implemented by 
UNHCR or humanitarian NGOs. However, neither 
UNHCR nor NGOs are in a position to address the 
structural economic problems in the host countries 
or in the countries of origin on their own. The desk 
review shows that any solution to protracted IDP and 
refugee situations requires an integrated approach of 
peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and development 
aid. To proceed with such comprehensive and holistic 
development and security projects it is furthermore 
necessary to examine positive and negative effects of 
PFD situations thoroughly. 
Use existing resiliencies and positive 
impacts of skills acquired in the host 
country for sustainable return and 
reintegration
Return and local integration are not mutually ex-
clusive. Although various studies on return and rein-
tegration have pointed out that conditions in the 
host region, particularly the degree of self-reliance, 
can shape the prospects for return and reintegration 
(see below), the two durable solutions of local integra-
tion and return are still often regarded as 
independently from each other. However, the more 
skills (e.g. vocational) displaced persons have learned 
in their host regions, the more likely they are to bet-
ter adapt to the conditions in the return region. Pro-
moting local integration measures and supporting 
education and work opportunities for the displaced 
in the host region, might also facilitate the return 
process and make reintegration more sustainable.
Suggestions for Future Programming
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rights and essential economic, social and psychologi-
cal needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A ref-
ugee [or other displaced person] in this situation is 
often unable to break free from enforced reliance on 
external assistance (UNHCR, 2004b).
These long-term displacement situations, in 
camps or other locations, present particular challeng-
es: private households that host forcibly displaced 
persons carry additional financial burdens, host 
states and the countries of origin often face diplo-
matic tensions (UNHCR, 2015, p. 116), alternative live-
lihoods and international assistance shrink over time, 
while levels of crime, insecurity, domestic or gen-
der-based violence and other security concerns are 
often observed to rise (Crisp, 2000; Loescher & Milner, 
2008, p. 355). The contest for scarce jobs, housing op-
portunities or farm land, for example, can lead to ris-
ing intercommunal or interethnic tensions poten-
tially culminating in social conflict between refugees 
 
and local communities in the host country  
(Adamson, 2006). 
PRS exist in most parts of the world (Crisp, 2003,  
p. 1), but the overwhelming share is found in least de-
veloped countries (LDCs) (Loescher, Milner, Newman, 
& Troeller, 2007, p. 492). The inability to address PRS is 
often linked reciprocally to the phenomenon of 
In 2014, there were almost 60 million displaced 
people, and numbers have not decreased since (see 
figure 1).1  Of those nearly 60 million, 38 million per-
sons were internally displaced2  and almost 20 million 
fled into neighbouring countries and surrounding re-
gions (UNHCR, 2015). 
Many of these persons affected by forced dis-
placement have been in exile or have been displaced 
within their own country for more than five years 
and, thus, find themselves in so-called protracted ref-
ugee situations (PRS). The most commonly used defi-
nition of PRS has been coined by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) who de-
fines them as situations where refugees have been in 
exile for more than five years,3  have a population of 
more than 25,000 refugees and situations 
in which refugees [and other forcibly displaced] find 
themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of 
limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic 
1 \  UNCHR underlined that this is “A level not previously seen in the 
post-World War II era” (UNHCR, 2015). It has to be kept in mind that 
numbers only present those displaced persons who have been registe-
red by UNHCR. There could be many more that have not been registe-
red. Numbers generally have to be taken with a pinch of salt as they 
come from sources with different degrees of reliability (ibid. p. 15). 
Some states, for example, might increase the numbers of refugees to 
receive more aid from the international community.
2 \ IDMC speaks of 38 million IDPs by the end of 2014 (Internal Displace-
ment Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015).
3 \  Palestinian refugees are not included.
Introduction
Figure 1  
Number of displaced persons from 2005 to 2014
Source: Based on the figure of UNHCR/ 18 June 2015 
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little research on return, the displacement–peace 
nexus5 in general and the link between displaced per-
sons and peace processes in particular. 
BICC has recently started the research project 
“Protected rather than protracted—strengthening ref-
ugees and peace”. It is funded by the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) within the Special Initiative “Fighting the 
causes of refugee movements, reintegrating refugees”. 
This Special Initiative aims to reduce the causes, alle-
viate the negative consequences of flight and dis-
placement through the stabilisation of neighbouring 
and host countries, as well as the conflict sensitive 
and sustainable reintegration of refugees. Within 
this framework, BICC’s project focusses particularly 
on the sustainable reintegration of refugees. For that, 
we are investigating the link between displacement, 
return and peace more closely, analysing under what 
circumstances the participation of displaced persons 
is relevant for the peace process. Moreover, we are 
asking what such an involvement could look like.
5 \  The displacement–peace nexus is a term coined by Koser. The link bet-
ween return and peace seems much more intuitive. Yet Koser actually 
agrees that return and reintegration can prevent further displacement. 
Yet the idea to talk about displacement instead of return it intended to 
include all displaced persons into such considerations. We therefore 
use the term whenever we want to stress that displaced persons that 
are not yet prospective returnees should be integrated into analyses.
so-called failed and fragile states 4 (Loescher & Milner, 
2008, p. 38). Yet, successful local re/integration activi-
ties might still take place even if the state institu-
tions are weak. The most prominent situations of pro-
tracted forced displacement (PFD) are found in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (DRC),, Rwanda, Burundi, Myanmar, 
Colombia and Somalia. It is difficult to find reliable 
numbers (Crisp, 2003, p. 4), but UNHCR assumes that 
by the end of 2014, 6.4 million refugees found them-
selves in protracted situations and numbers are ris-
ing (UNHCR, 2015, p. 8). Many protracted situations 
have persisted for more than 10 or 20 years (see figure 
2). In order to neither prolong these situations and 
cause strain on the already poor regions nor destabi-
lise the fragile states, situations of protracted forced 
displacement (PFD) need to be addressed and “un-
locked” (Zetter, 2011, p. 2). The Geneva Convention re-
lating to the status of refugees and other internation-
al human rights instruments guarantee in principle 
the right to freedom of movement and to seek paid 
employment. 
Refugee scholars and policymakers argue that 
the failure to address situations of PFD may under-
mine the peace process in the concerned or neigh-
bouring countries (Brookings-Bern Project on Inter-
nal Displacement, 2010; Kälin, 2008; Loescher & 
Milner, 2008; Loescher et al., 2007). Adelman, for ex-
ample, points out that “the conventional wisdom of 
most refugee experts holds that there is a necessary 
connection between forging and implementing a 
peace agreement and enduring the successful return 
of refugees” (2002, p. 273). However, this displacement–
peace nexus  has never been systematically tested. 
Moreover, it is unclear how return and peace is inter-
linked. Despite the political prominence of the topic, 
the high numbers of situations of PFD and its risk for 
human rights violations and security, there has been 
4 \  The discussion about the definition and characteristics of failed states 
has been ongoing for decades (cf. Englebert & Tull, 2008; Gordon, 1997; 
Helman & Ratner, 1992; Hippler, 2005). It seems worth noting that it is 
an externally assigned status description and might not necessarily 
coincide with the extent that local governance mechanisms are in 
place and functioning. For example, in many so-called failed, failing 
and fragile states various actors besides the state have traditionally 
held or newly taken up tasks that are classically—from a Western-cen-
tric perspective—considered to be core competencies of state govern-
ments. 
Figure 2  
Number of protracted refugee situations by duration
Source: UNHCR, 2015, p. 11
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and subnational government agencies have been left 
out. Many peace research studies have also been con-
ducted that did not take the role of displaced persons 
in the peace process into account. This Paper, in con-
trast, shows that a more multi-faceted perspective is 
necessary to fully understand the process of return 
and to guarantee its sustainability. In our opinion, 
displaced persons and returnees may be able to stabi-
lise peace (just as well as they can prolong or renew 
violent conflict). By analysing what makes reintegra-
tion successful, renewed displacement may be pre-
vented, and root causes of displacement identified 
(Koser, 2008).
The Paper first provides an overview of previous 
research on return as well as on the role of returnees 
in peace processes in recent history. The paper then 
turns to the current models of responses and pre-
sents the major stakeholders in the return and rein-
tegration process. It proceeds by bringing forward 
some of the challenges and impacts of these process-
es. In the end, we show the gaps that remain for fur-
ther studies in this area and discuss their 
consequences.
The study6 focusses on return7 as a process of 
which the reintegration of displaced persons8 —both 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)—is 
one part. It highlights this process dimension, which 
so far has received little attention. Research in this 
area still features many gaps some of which we wish 
to fill. We suppose that violent conflict, either on the 
local, national or regional level, may re-emerge if re-
turn is not complemented by successful reintegration. 
Our assumption is that reintegration is successful 
when returnees no longer have to flee and relocate. 
In other words, successful reintegration would mean 
that returnees are able to sustain their livelihoods 
and face no persecution (Lukunka, 2013, p. ii). Our 
working hypothesis is that the participation of dis-
placed persons in peace processes is a crucial factor 
for their sustainable reintegration. Put differently, we 
assume that there is a link between return and peace 
in general, and we intend to determine the specifics.
Therefore, we intend to analyse under which con-
ditions the participation of displaced persons in 
peace processes can be an important basis for their 
reintegration. With peace process, we not only mean 
peace agreements, but also the social, political and 
economic context surrounding it. A peace process 
can be local, national or regional or all three. Our 
main research questions are: 1) What chances and 
risks can be observed during the reintegration of dis-
placed persons? 2) What makes reintegration sustain-
able and successful? 3) Under which conditions does 
the participation of displaced persons in peace pro-
cesses play a key role in the sustainability of their re-
turn and peace? 
Until now, the perspectives of policymakers or le-
gal scholars have largely dominated the topics of re-
turn and reintegration. The experiences and voices of 
the displaced, as well as those of host communities 
6 \  We thank Laura Gerken, Clara Schmitz-Pranghe, and BICC staff for 
assistance as well as Ulrike Krause for helpful comments.
7 \  We hold the term return to be a global term that encompasses repatri-
ation. Repatriation is defined as an organised return process in which 
displaced persons return to their country of origin accompanied by a 
third party.
8 \  The term displaced person (DP) refers to all persons that identify 
themselves as forcibly displaced. This means that - rather than the 
(temporary) destination - the starting point of displacement is used to 
categorize people that are labeled as IDPs, refugees, stateless or unre-
gistered individuals (e.g. urban dwellers). 
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tion (cf. Chimni, 1999). Most of IRO’s resources were 
devoted to resettlement, however, and over one mil-
lion people were helped to leave Europe and to per-
manently resettle in the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia and Latin America by IRO in the four years 
between 1947 and 1951 (Kleist, 2015). 
World War II, Cold War and resettlement
The founding of the UNHCR and the passing of 
the Geneva Refugee Convention (convention relat-
ing to the status of refugees), both in 1951, were re-
sponses to the plight of 50 million refugees and dis-
placed after World War II. It took the UNHCR until 
the mid-1960s and many appeals, awareness raising 
activities, etc., until all people displaced by World 
War II and its aftermath could be resettled. Many of 
them had spent over a decade in situations of pro-
tracted displacement all over Europe. When these 
situations were eventually overcome this represent-
ed an “…often-forgotten precedent for addressing 
the durable solution and protection needs of refu-
gees for whom neither local integration nor repatri-
ation are viable options” (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 
7). Not until 1967 were the geographical and tempo-
ral restrictions relating to the European heritage of 
the Geneva Convention removed in an additional 
protocol.
The politicised nature of responses to armed 
conflicts during the Cold War era, among them nu-
merous proxy-wars on different continents, ren-
dered repatriation a non-solution. People fleeing 
from the Soviet Union or associated countries to 
Western Europe were nearly always offered perma-
nent permission to stay. Hence, the tendency to pri-
oritise resettlement as a durable solution further in-
creased between the end of World War II and about 
1985; many, if not most, refugees were resettled in 
Western countries throughout this time period 
(Bradley, 2013, p. 1). Partly, this may have been due to 
the need for additional labour in these economies 
after the destruction of the world wars (cf. Chimni, 
1999). But also in Africa, people who had been forced 
to flee from armed struggles against colonialism 
and Apartheid were hosted and offered local integra-
tion or resettlement by neighbouring countries (Ru-
tinwa, 2002). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s hardly 
Today’s understanding of what makes an IDP or a 
refugee9,  their legal status, approaches towards situ-
ations of displacement and PRS, blind spots in prac-
tice, and gaps in knowledge production are influ-
enced by past developments and depend on the 
observer’s perspective. Responses to forced displace-
ment and armed conflict have changed fundamen-
tally since World War II. Looking back us not only 
allows to understand the political, economic and 
social developments underlying the changing re-
sponses to war and forced displacement, but also 
allows us to gain a more comprehensive under-
standing of the broad variety of possible solutions 
vis-à-vis the ones prioritised by policymakers. 
2.1 Changing responses to forced  
displacement 
The international refugee regime emerged at a time 
when armed conflicts were typically interstate con-
flicts, marked by a clear beginning and a clear end. 
They were terminated by the victory of one fighting 
party or alliance, which would then determine the 
conditions for the post-conflict order. The number 
of refugees and displaced persons as a consequence 
of World War II and its aftermath was higher than 
at any later stage throughout the 20th century. Yet, 
the overwhelming majority of refugees never re-
turned to where they had fled from. From 1947 to 
1950, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) 
had adopted repatriation as a possible solution, but 
only repatriated five per cent of those displaced in 
Europe (and registered with IRO). It recognised vol-
untariness as an essential precondition for repatria-
9 \  Usually, both terms are used as defined in international law according 
to which a refugee is an individual that “owing to a well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is un-
willing to avail himself of the protection of that country“ (UN,1951, 
Refugee Convention, New York). IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) 
are defined as “…persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, 
in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed con-
flict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an inter-
nationally recognized state border (The Brookings Institution Project, 
1999)..
2. Historical Overview:  
The Context of Displacement
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any repatriation took place in Africa.10  Local inte-
gration was common and Africa was a “shining ex-
ample of solidarity and hospitality” (Frelick, quoted 
in Chimni, 1999, p. 11). As of the 1970s, more and 
more PFD situations emerged on a global scale. The 
prolonged conflicts in Indochina, Afghanistan, Cen-
tral America, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa 
forced millions of people into exile. Between 1977 
and 1982, the global refugee population tripled from 
three to ten million (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 7). At 
that time return did not rank high on the interna-
tional agenda and was hardly considered an option. 
Moreover, peace processes were not yet established 
as a common tool to settle conflicts and, thus, there 
was no discussion about the role of displaced per-
sons in peace processes either.  
From resettlement to repatriation
The end of the Cold War raised hopes for a 
peaceful new world order and a decrease of new dis-
placements. Contrary to this, however, the global ref-
ugee population increased further from 14.9 million 
in 1990 to 17.2 million in 1991. Initial proxy wars, 
such as in Angola and Afghanistan, had developed 
their own dynamics of violence and continued; new 
conflicts emerged during the transition processes in 
the former Soviet Union (Nagorno-Karabakh, Geor-
gia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Chechnya), but also in 
former Yugoslavia and Liberia (cf. Koser & Black, 
1999). Practices and priorities regarding durable 
solutions changed fundamentally in this context. 
The interpretation of the Geneva Convention crite-
ria became increasingly strict in Europe and the 
United States, and the idea of “bogus refugees”11  was 
born, which turned refugee status from an impor-
tant safety net for genuinely persecuted people into 
something at risk of being exploited (cf. Koser & 
Black, 1999). Against this background, UNHCR start-
ed promoting repatriation as a durable solution in 
1985, arguing that it was the “preferred solution 
among most of the world’s refugees” (Bradley, 2013,  
p. 3). By that time, many of the refugee hosting 
countries were (and still are) among the poorest in 
10 \  Apart from Algerians in 1962.
11 \  People referred to as “bogus” in the literature are those who apply for 
refugee status but come for economic reasons instead of persecution.
the world. In the absence of effective burden-shar-
ing mechanisms, both in terms of granting asylum 
and in terms of resource and wealth distribution, re-
strictive access to territory, temporary instead of 
permanent residence or protection status, and re-
strictions on refugees’ rights quickly spread from 
the global North to other areas of the world (Chimni, 
1999).
The nature of armed conflict had changed fun-
damentally by that time: conflicts were predomi-
nantly intrastate. This trend further continued dur-
ing the 1990s. Conflicts became increasingly 
protracted and the share of civilian victims of war 
had increased significantly (Bermudez Torres, 2005). 
Whereas at the beginning of the 20th century about 
90 per cent of all war casualties were military per-
sonnel, in the 1990s it was more likely to be 75-90 per 
cent civilians. Civilians were more often the deliber-
ate targets of violence. This led to a rising numbers 
of forced displacements (ibid.). The international 
community sought to respond by introducing peace 
processes, negotiated peace agreements as well as 
other means of conflict resolution, including an in-
creasing number of multilateral peace operations. 
With the end of the Cold War, attempts to accom-
modate seemingly intractable ethnic conflicts 
through peace processes (INCORE, 2004) and settle 
civil wars by negotiated peace agreements had be-
come more common (Stedman, 2002, p. 1). Since 1980, 
reflecting the trend towards more repatriations, 
most major peace agreements have started to in-
clude provisions regarding the return of refugees 
and IDPs (Phuong, 2005). Therefore, such agree-
ments have become crucial in determining the 
rights and opportunities of displaced persons to re-
turn. Otherwise, issues pertaining to return are also 
often settled in separate tripartite agreements be-
tween the country of origin, the host country, and 
the UNHCR. 
In 1989, two comprehensive plans of action, the 
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Ref-
ugees (CPA) and the International Conference on 
Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), both negoti-
ated under the leadership of the UNHCR, proved to 
be very effective tools for unlocking prolonged or 
protracted situations of forced displacement (Milner 
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more returns limited the applicability of other dura-
ble solutions such as local integration and thereby 
prolonged displacement: Since the late 1980s, many 
governments of the global South confined the move-
ment of displaced populations to the camps only. This 
often had negative effects on “the human rights and 
livelihoods of those displaced” (Milner & Loescher, 
2011, p. 4).  
The decade of voluntary repatriation
In 1992, the UNHCR declared a decade of volun-
tary repatriation to make this the principal durable 
solution (Bradley, 2013). This increasing involvement 
of UNHCR in repatriation constituted quite a shift in 
its focus of activities and also expanded its scope to-
wards more development-oriented activities such as 
reintegration (Macrae, 1999). Return programmes 
were expanded significantly: According to the UN-
HCR, more than nine million refugees repatriated be-
tween 1991 and 1996 (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 7). 
These returns were “high profile mass returns to a 
small group of countries with highly visible peace 
processes” (Black, 2006, p. 25), e.g. Cambodia, Mozam-
bique, Kosovo, Afghanistan, but also included repatri-
ation to Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda and 
Burundi, some of which saw new displacements in 
the course of that decade. Due to new displacements 
all over the world, the total number of refugees at the 
end of the 1990s amounted to 13 million and thus was 
the same as at the beginning of the decade (Bakewell, 
1999). This number consisted to a large part of per-
sons stranded in situations of protracted displace-
ment (UNHCR, 2004b).
In 1996, then Director of UNHCR’s Division of In-
ternational Protection (DIP), Dennis McNamara, an-
nounced that refugees may be sent back to less than 
optimal conditions in their home country and 
against their will. The decade of voluntary repatria-
tion led to a “consolidation of repatriation as the pre-
ferred political solution (…) not only for UNHCR but 
also for much of the international humanitarian 
community” (Black, 2006, p. 26). Increased and accel-
erated return rates lent “weight and popular legiti-
macy to a discourse that has come to dominate refu-
gee policy, namely that repatriation is the optimum 
and most feasible ‘durable solution’ to the refugee 
& Loescher, 2011). The CPA for Indochinese refugees, 
supported in the end by 70 states, helped to resettle 
half a million Vietnamese refugees (altogether, 1.3 
million were resettled). Thousands of lives were 
saved as refugees had been taking to unseaworthy 
boats as a last resort (Kleist, 2015). According to Betts 
(2006, p. 5), the following factors made these CPAs 
successful. They 
   \ drew on all possible (durable) solutions, not 
only repatriation, resettlement and local 
integration,
   \ rather facilitated a general expansion of migra-
tion opportunities;
   \ involved countries of origin, host and resettle-
ment countries thus establishing effective bur-
den- and responsibility-sharing mechanisms;
   \ were good examples of co-operation between 
several United Nations (UN) agencies and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (cf. 
Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 8). 
2.2 Repatriation and return
Regardless of these experiences,  the push to-
wards repatriation and a further tendency to pull 
away from protection levels guaranteed under the 
Geneva Convention and the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees continued dur-
ing the 1990s (cf. Koser & Black, 1999). In Europe, the 
war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s increased the interest 
in temporary protection schemes in receiving coun-
tries, thus shifting the refugee status from being per-
manent to being temporary: in the presence of so 
called internal flight alternatives (Chimni, 1999, p. 8), 
refugees can hence be sent back to their country of 
origin. The Yugoslavian example showed the limits of 
premature repatriation programmes: the involuntary 
return of over a quarter of a million refugees to Bos-
nia due to domestic considerations in Germany after 
1996 turned the majority of the returnees into IDPs. 
These IDPs neither had the necessary protection by 
their government nor by an international organisa-
tion (Black, 2006; Koser & Black, 1999). After the war 
in Rwanda, Tanzania changed its open door policy 
based on the argument that other much richer na-
tions did the same (Chimni, 1999, p. 12). The push for 
PROTECTED RATHER THAN PROTRACTED
15 \ \ WORKING PAPER 3  \ 2015
(Phuong, 2005). The quality of such provisions varies: 
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with its extensive provi-
sions on return is considered a role model; while the 
1992 General Peace Agreement for Mozambique and 
the Interim Agreement for Kosovo are criticised for 
their lack of provisions on voluntariness (Bradley, 
2013, p. 49). 
New millennium and new challenges
With the start of the new millennium, the topic 
of protracted refugee situations (PRS) and protracted 
forced displacement (PFD) became part of the agen-
das of UNHCR and other international actors, since a 
decrease in inter-state conflicts freed capacities for 
dealing with this pressing, but so far neglected issue. 
The increased awareness of the negative implications 
crisis” (Koser & Black, 1999). 12 Nevertheless, the sus-
tainability of the returns was often highly uncertain, 
especially when the issues that had been leading to 
displacement in the first place remained unresolved 
(Black, 2006, p. 27). At a time, where repatriation was 
given more and more significance, not only in peace 
processes but also as a prerequisite and / or an indica-
tor for peace, the actual practice of increasingly im-
mature and involuntary repatriation risked to severe-
ly undermine peacebuilding efforts. 
Contents and provisions of peace agreements re-
garding return changed over time, their focus shift-
ing from return assistance to the adoption of more 
rights-based approaches. Increasingly, they con-
tained detailed regulations to “address past injustices 
and prevent future violations of refugees’ rights” 
12 \  An exception may be the case of the Palestinian refugees (Black, 2006).
Figure 3  
Regional overview of returns
Source: IDMC, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015, p. 12
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of PFD situations prompted individual host countries, 
such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Tanzania, to move 
away from the practice of “isolated and insecure refu-
gee camps” to local integration by naturalisation 
(Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 10). In 2008, UNHCR 
launched the PRS initiative, which called for better 
co-ordination between the agencies involved, in-
volvement of the displaced as well as countries of ori-
gin and residence and for a joint effort by affected 
states and NGOs. The PRS initiative also emphasises 
that humanitarian aid to displaced populations 
should focus on increasing their self-reliance as the 
best precondition for any of the durable solutions 
and underlines the potential of displaced populations 
to contribute to broader processes of peacebuilding 
and development. This process peaked in the adop-
tion of the Conclusion on PRS by the Executive Com-
mittee (ExCom) of UNHCR in 2009 (cf. Milner & 
Loescher, 2011). 
At the same time, the repatriation trend seemed 
to continue. The number of returnees assisted by UN-
HCR rose from under 500,000 in 2001 to almost 2.5 
million in 2002, and over one million in 2003 (Bermu-
dez Torres, 2005). Altogether, 11.4 million refugees re-
turned to their countries of origin between 1998 and 
2007. In contrast to the pre-1985 era, when resettle-
ment was the most frequent solution, the ratio was 
one resettled refugee to fourteen returnees. Since 
2008, however, repatriation numbers have been de-
clining, though IDP returns are increasing (Bradley, 
2013, p. 3). The ExCom Conclusion of 2009 still upholds 
this paradigm, even though stating that there can’t 
be a blueprint to PRS, and frequently mentions repa-
triation as the “preferred durable solution.” It also 
states that “voluntary repatriation should not neces-
sarily be conditioned on the accomplishment of po-
litical solutions in the country of origin” (quoted in 
Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 17). Figure 3 demonstrates 
that in the Central Africa region, including Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Su-
dan and Sudan, in 2014 most returns of IDPs have tak-
en place (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015, p. 12).   
Relation of peace and return
The return of all people displaced by the conflict 
is now understood as an essential part of peace-
building processes. In 2005, Kofi Annan emphasised 
that the return of refugees and IDPs is a “major part 
of any post-conflict scenario” and “a critical factor 
in sustaining a peace process and in revitalizing 
economic activity” (Annan, 2005). In other words: 
the successes of refugee repatriation and peace op-
erations are now believed to be closely intertwined. 
Return movements are expected to help stabilise in-
secure border regions, serve as an expression of con-
fidence in the peace process, and the formerly exiled 
populations may contribute to peace-building and 
development. The concept of return is strongly 
linked to the idea of transitional justice—namely 
the ideal that an expulsion of people is not accepted 
(McGinn, 2000; Sooka, 2006; Williams, 2007). At the 
same time, tensions are to be expected over property 
issues, limited access to services such as schools 
and hospitals, or over assistance that targets return-
ees only. The case of Afghanistan exemplifies this 
risk: since 2002, five million refugees have been re-
patriated, yet returnees were not provided with the 
support needed to make a sustainable contribution 
to peace (Bradley, 2013, p. 6f.), which led the UNHCR 
representative to Afghanistan, Peter Nicolaus, con-
clude that repatriation to the country was “the big-
gest mistake UNHCR ever made” (reported by AFP, 
2011). Premature and forced return, in sum, poses 
one of the biggest risks, both to the returnees and to 
the peace process.
To sum up, over the past 70 years, the interna-
tional refugee regime has developed from one that 
promoted resettlement to one that mainly promotes 
repatriation, even though experiences have shown 
that increasing the options for refugees and dis-
placed instead of reducing them is the best way to 
overcome PRS / PFD situations. The success of peace 
agreements has come to be linked with the repatria-
tion of refugees, even though there is no empirical 
evidence for such a link and repatriation itself, espe-
cially if not entirely voluntary, can spark conflict in-
stead of promoting peace (Adelman, 2002, p. 282). 
However, experiences made and knowledge gath-
ered in these seven decades places the international 
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2.3 Refugee regime and peace processes
Scientific research on return more often than not 
has followed policy discourses and practices rather 
than shaping them. For example, the new attention 
awarded to PRS situations by the UNHCR after 2000 
has resulted in quite a number of research activities 
that include, for example, the PRS Project at the Uni-
versity of Oxford, and the “Protracted Displacement 
in Asia” Project based at Griffith University. These re-
search projects contribute to a better understanding 
of causes and consequences of and possible responses 
to this problem (Milner & Loescher, 2011). Still, de-
spite more extensive research on return in the last 
decades, many gaps still remain. Bradley’s focus on 
just return (Bradley, 2008), for example, has taken a 
long time to be embraced by practitioners even 
though it has been widely discussed in academic cir-
cles and fully meets international legal standards. 
Until the 1990s, the topic of return was largely ig-
nored in academia (Koser & Black, 1999, p. 9). Long 
(2013b) points out that the majority of studies on re-
patriation has been put forward in the last thirty 
years, because repatriations were considered largely 
undisputed before and because the discipline of refu-
gee and forced migration studies started to gain 
prominence then. Only the controversies emerging 
from the push for more repatriation have fuelled the 
expansion of research in refugee return. 
In this context, academics started to question the 
underlying assumptions, such as the motivations of 
host and home governments, of the international 
community, which includes the UNHCR, and of the 
refugees themselves (cf. Bakewell, 1999; Black, 2002; 
Chimni, 1999; Koser & Black, 1999). Bradley’s (2008) 
just return approach e.g. stressed that it is necessary 
to respect the choice of the refugees and to assure 
that returnees were to be re-integrated with full con-
siderations for their legal rights—at least the same 
rights as all other compatriots are enjoying. Clearly, 
the decade of voluntary repatriation has triggered a 
lot of (critical) academic interest throughout and par-
ticularly towards its end. Chimni, for example, criti-
cises that the desire of refugees to go home was sim-
ply assumed as a fact and not perceived as a 
“hypothesis to be tested” (Chimni, 1999, p. 5). He also 
refugee regime in a good position to apply the les-
sons learned and contribute significantly to over-
coming todays PRS / PFD situations. A major impedi-
ment to any progress in unlocking protracted 
displacement is nevertheless the perception of 
Southern governments that the discussion on PRS is 
a move by “the North” to contain the refugee problem 
in the South. Today, 86 per cent of the world’s refugees 
are hosted in developing regions. It is the highest 
number in more than two decades (UNHCR, 2015, p. 2). 
These developing countries may perceive “…pressures 
by the international donor community to encourage 
solutions for refugees through local integration as 
‘burden-shifting’ and an infringement of their sover-
eignty” (Milner & Loescher, 2011, p. 6). These coun-
tries may hence have reservations about interna-
tional aid (cf. box 1).
Box 1  
Sri Lanka Peace Agreement: Non-compliance or the limits 
of international aid
Refugees or DPs are not mentioned in the Sri Lanka Peace Agreement 
(United States Institute of Peace, 2002). Currently, an increasing 
number of Sri Lankan refugees want to return. Most of them stay in 
refugee camps in Tamil Nadu in India, others in Malaysia, Europe, the 
United States and Canada. There are an additional 320,000 IDPs in 
Sri Lanka who left their homes before and after the conflicts in 2008—
approximately 14,000 of them returned to their homes by 2010. The 
return of 180,000 IDPs who left their home after April 2008 has been 
linked to a number of problems: First, the land is contaminated with 
landmines or unexploded ordnances. Second, many returnees who have 
lost their documents find it difficult to prove land ownership (Dolores, 
2011, pp. 7–9). Returnees also face problems with the distribution of 
so-called standard return packages (cf. Dolores, 2011, p. 8). Another 
problem regarding the support of IDPs grows from the fact that hu-
manitarian agencies are not allowed to visit the areas where IDPs are 
located. Every UN agency needs a special permission by the Ministry of 
Defense to go to the north of the country. Often the Ministry rejects ap-
plications without reason. This has hampered the support of IDPs and 
returnees in the north of Sri Lanka (Dolores, 2011, p. 12-13) . The case of 
Sri Lanka thus underlines how important collaboration of the country 
of origin with the international community is—especially for IDPs: If 
a government does not recognise IDPs, it can limit access for interna-
tional actors or it can refuse to accept returnees or their demands.
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to the general context of returning displaced persons. 
It seems, nevertheless, that some lessons can be learnt 
from them. For example, by excluding certain groups 
from reintegration programmes might create a feel-
ing of inequality and raise tensions between those 
taking part in reintegration programmes and those 
who do not (Specker, 2007); as it might be the case be-
tween stayees and returnees in the displacement 
context. 
Furthermore, while the Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis Unit at UNHCR published a number of im-
portant studies on PRS and the return process in the 
last decade (e.g. Bakewell, 1999; Crisp, 2003; Macrae, 
1999), the reintegration process and its link to peace 
is still understudied. Long (2013b) emphasises that 
there are few political analyses of return while legal 
scholars have dominated research. Yet this discussion 
is not matched by the actual legal practice, as Brad-
ley’s (2013) case studies in Bosnia, Mozambique, Pal-
estina and Guatemala about the minimum legal con-
ditions respectively the rights of refugees show. 
In addition, there is even less research on the top-
ic of IDPs. Only the Brookings Bern Project (2010) fo-
cussed on IDPs in peace processes. Yet although the 
criticises that the “… idealized image of return helped 
legitimize measures which compelled refugees to re-
turn” (Chimni, 1999, p. 5), rendering voluntariness of 
return secondary in practice. Repatriation thus, 
according to some academic critics, showed charac-
teristics of a self-fulfilling prophecy: The more com-
mon sense the idea became, the more it tended to render 
alternatives (seemingly) obsolete. Research, for ex-
ample, shows how conditions in exile shape pros-
pects for return and that local integration and suc-
cessful repatriation are not mutually exclusive 
(Kuschminder, 2014; Long, 2010b; van Hear, 2006). 
They are rather supportive and complementary to 
each other. This insight, however, has not yet had a 
major impact on the refugee regime in practice. 
Until now, research on return has centred around 
three main areas: the conditions for the decision to 
return, the actual return to the country of origin and 
the experiences after return, during the reintegration 
process (Hammond, 2014), whereby the last area of re-
search is the least researched. For a long time, hardly 
any studies analysed why refugees decide to move back, 
or what experiences returnees have had and which 
challenges they have faced. One reason for the scarce 
literature in this area could be related to the difficul-
ties in studying returnees. Returnees are often dis-
persed and thus hard to reach and to be identified. 
Moreover, they are often left on their own without 
any assistance (Allen & Morsink, 1994, p. 2), although 
lately there have been improvements in this area. 
Koser and Black (1999), for example, identify two 
major challenges for repatriation programmes in this 
regard: (i) incorporation of refugees’ own ideas about 
repatriation, their own perceptions and expectations 
and changing priorities into repatriation initiatives 
and (ii) attention to the experiences of refugees after 
their return, including physical conditions such as 
land mines, housing, lacking access to key resources 
like land, labour, working capital and skills, as well as 
social confrontation (Bakewell, 1999, p. 6ff.). 
The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-
tion (DDR) literature has also pointed to difficulties of 
return and reintegration (see, for example: Conoir & 
Verna, 2006). However, while they have made impor-
tant contributions to understanding reintegration, it 
is not yet clear how these frameworks can be applied 
Box 2  
The Rwanda Peace Agreement: The transnational 
implications of return
The Rwanda Peace Agreement (INCORE, 1993) is mostly considered a 
success. It addresses questions of repatriation and the resettlement of 
Rwandan refugees. It includes guidelines regarding property issues, 
food, shelter and reintegration support. Still, about 100,000 Rwandans, 
mainly Hutus who fled in 1994, have not yet returned. These Hutus are 
a typical example of a residual caseload, of DPs who do not feel safe in 
the country of origin despite effective peace agreements in place (cf. Crisp, 
2003, p. 3ff.). Such residual caseloads underline the need to acknowl-
edge subjective opinions of DPs about security and the responsibility of 
the international community to respect the principle of non-refoule-
ment. The Rwandan case shows that it is not only important to en-
large evaluations of effects of repatriation and peace agreements in 
time (as in the Liberian case) but also in space—the situation in the 
Great Lake region is intrinsically linked to Rwanda and its policies 
towards refugees. .
PROTECTED RATHER THAN PROTRACTED
19 \ \ WORKING PAPER 3  \ 2015
that refugee repatriation is a precondition for peace, 
and that, second, peace can be achieved without repa-
triation and vice versa. They believe that it is rather a 
question of the type of peace and the type of war that 
determine the impact of repatriation for peacebuilding. 
There is anecdotal evidence that refugees and 
IDPs can influence the negotiations of peace ac-
cords as well as their implementation, for example 
in Guatemala. However, this does not make return 
and reintegration to these countries automatically 
less challenging (Bermudez Torres, 2005). In many 
other cases, the chances for displaced persons (DPs) 
to meaningfully participate in peace processes are 
extremely limited to non-existent, however. The im-
portance attributed to the role of return for the sus-
tainability of peace, the practical disconnect be-
tween peace negotiations and refugee participation 
as well as the lack of knowledge regarding the em-
pirical links makes this a topic for more research. 
The literature suggests that DPs are important 
for the peace process because their participation is 
crucial for transitional justice, reconciliation, and a 
rights-based approach in the long run (Sooka, 2006; 
Sriram & Herman, 2009). If the large populations of 
DPs are not incorporated in the peace process and 
Brookings Bern Project presents the reasons for inte-
grating IDPs in peace processes, they do not investi-
gate the link more closely. Studies by Long (2013b), 
Loescher and Milner (2008), Bradley (2013), Black and 
Koser (1999) and Allen and Morsink (1994) which re-
present the most comprehensive overview of the re-
turn process and its challenges in recent years have 
not yet included IDPs in their discussion. Conse-
quently, research on return, reintegration and the 
role of displaced persons has been very rudimentary 
until now. The debate on PFD, in sum, has been large-
ly dominated by policy literature with a strong bias 
towards states, governments, refugees and the legal 
context.
Displacement and peace processes
Despite the fact that various scholars (Brook-
ings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010; Kä-
lin, 2008; Loescher & Milner, 2008; Loescher et al., 
2007) assume that the inclusion of displaced persons 
in peace processes reduces the risk of renewed con-
flict, as the example of the Rwandan peace agreement 
in box 2 displays, the link has never been systemati-
cally studied. Furthermore, other authors (Adelman, 
2002, p. 273ff.) stress that there is, first, no evidence 
Figure 4 
Breaking the conflict cycle
Based on figure 1 of the Brookings-Bern Project 2010, p. 17)
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their needs not taken into account, new conflict 
could arise (Rettig, 2008). As refugees and IDPs in 
some countries are part of the conflict, their partici-
pation could help resolve the conflict. Assisting re-
turnees in the reintegration process can further-
more help to prevent future tensions (Koser, 2008). 
Agreeing, for example, on property rights and land 
issues before displaced persons return, might avoid 
new conflict situations upon return. Including dis-
placed persons could also create more trust in the 
peace process and, thus, it may be more likely that 
the newly established peace is respected. Further-
more, it is often assumed by policymakers that early 
reconciliation work can help to make the reintegra-
tion and peace more sustainable. Nevertheless, there 
is no empirical evidence for this and still need to be 
analysed further. 
Figure 4 gives an overview of the inclusion argu-
ment brought forward by the policy literature for 
displaced persons in peace processes. 
The argument is that by finding a durable solu-
tion for the inclusion of displaced persons the cycle 
of conflict can be broken. However, to be able to un-
derstand the role of displaced persons in peace pro-
cesses more clearly, the concepts of return, reinte-
gration and peace, as well as the major stakeholders, 
need to be investigated more closely. We will start 
with the discussion of the concepts in the next 
chapter.
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Guinea-Bissau) and the Great Lakes Region (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo—DRC, Uganda). Long-distance 
travel requires resources and planning, so when people 
belong to particularly poor and vulnerable groups and 
the flight-inducing factors hit them by surprise, they 
are more likely to stay within the proximity of the place 
they have fled from, that is they are more likely to be-
come IDPs. However, while the differentiation between 
refugees and IDPs can be merely administrative, it can 
have significant effects on how they are potentially in-
volved, recognized and treated in the peace process. 
Rigid categories, fluid practice 
Globally, numbers of IDPs are rising compared to 
those of refugees. According to the Internal Displace-
ment Monitoring Centre’s (IDMC’s) most recent re-
port the number of IDPs is three times higher than 
that of refugees worldwide and their numbers keep 
rising (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015, p. 7, see figure 5).
IDPs are in a particularly vulnerable position as, 
contrary to refugees, they have not left the territory of 
the state whose institutions are often those either 
unable to guarantee their safety and thus responsible 
for the displacement, or those unable to prevent it. 
Governments and armed groups are reluctant to re-
spect international standards because IDPs often be-
long to minorities and they often regard IDPs as re-
bels, or criminals. At times they prefer to close camps 
to pretend that they can assure that everybody is safe 
and secure (Simpson & Sawyer, 2010, p. 49ff.). IDPs, in 
contrast to refugees, do not benefit from specific legal 
protection (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Dis-
placement, 2010). Their legal status is not different 
from that of other citizens while they are practically 
exposed to most of the risks refugees are facing 
(Couldrey & Morris, 2006, p. 12). According to the Guid-
ing Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998 that 
have been approved by the United Nations but are not 
legally binding, IDPs, should be helped to return to 
their area of origin, similarly to refugees (The Brook-
ings Institution Project, 1999). These Guiding Princi-
ples clarify the conditions of return (voluntary, in 
safety and dignity), the role of the state (help to en-
sure full participation of IDPs, assist in the recovery 
of former property or ensure compensation) and of 
The topic of return, reintegration and peace 
brings together various concepts and stakeholders 
with different views on the same matter. Concepts of 
return and post-conflict are often introduced without 
a clear understanding of their meaning. Additionally, 
particular world views and subsequent categorisa-
tions of conflict, peace, post-conflict, etc. set the 
frame for potential engagement and the form of proj-
ects. The role and position of actors involved general-
ly set the agenda of action. At times, they also create 
seemingly insurmountable barriers between the dif-
ferent systems, their logic of action and, consequently, 
ability to communicate with each other in a way that 
facilitates co-operation instead of disguising 
divergencies. 
This chapter will introduce the concepts devel-
oped so far as well as the main stakeholders involved 
in the return process and will point to the challenges 
and dilemmas they bring with them. We will also 
show several key differentiations that we find impor-
tant when it comes to the role of displaced persons in 
peace processes:
   \ the term “displaced persons” and the differen-
tiation between refugees and IDPs 
   \ the cyclical dimension of post-conflict situa-
tions and the different stakeholders involved,
   \ the multiple aspects of the return process and 
how it is related to peacebuilding.
3.1 Displaced persons, hosts and  
protracted refugee situations
Refugees and IDPs alike can be involved in peace 
process or protracted situations. This is why we refer to 
them as displaced persons as the line between one and 
the other is often merely administrative. If the borders 
are porous (and they often are), displaced persons 
change from one status to the other depending on the 
advantages connected to such a choice. Experts from 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), and others 13 have confirmed such movements 
e.g. in the West African region (Senegal, Gambia, 
13 \  Personal conversations  of co-author Markus Rudolf with various sta-
keholders, policymakers and experts from international, national, or-
ganisations and institutions 2012
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a minimum of 50 per cent of the countries under ob-
servation by IDMC did not have any or just a few IDP 
camps (Davies, 2012, p. 4). 14 The number of displaced 
persons staying with host families is naturally higher, 
where managed camps do not (yet) exist, such as 
shortly after the outbreak of a conflict, or in countries 
where the government is reluctant to establish or 
maintain camps for its IDPs (DRC, Sudan, Syria, etc.). 
In such situations, the largest burden rests on the 
shoulders of private persons and communities who 
are willing to help without remuneration or support 
(Davies, 2012; IDMC, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015, 
p. 26). In line with the growing concern for IDPs 
(since 1998; cf. Cohen, 2004) the international com-
munity has also become increasingly aware of the 
importance of addressing the issue of hosting ar-
rangements in PRS in recent years (cf. Davies, 2012). 
14 \  It should be noted that the percentage refers to IDPs assisted by UNH-
CR – the actual number is higher
international organisations (should have access to as-
sist in return and reintegration). Yet according to var-
ious lessons learned it is particularly important for a 
truly participative process to enhance the protection 
of the numerous IDPs during and after return and to 
include them and their needs in peace agreements 
(Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 
2010).
Another important distinction to be made is that 
of host country represented by the host country’s 
government and the actual hosts. Only 30 per cent of 
refugees live in planned/managed camps, 63 per cent 
live in private accommodation according to UNHCR 
(UNHCR, 2015, p. 43). 52 per cent of the nearly 14.7 mil-
lion IDPs who were under the protection of the UN-
HCR in 2010 did not stay in formal camps (Brook-
ings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, 2013). And 
Figure 5  
IDPs versus refugee numbers
Source: IDMC, Norwegian Refugee Council 2015, p. 9
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3.2 The concept and practice of return
Besides our particular understanding of DPs, PFD, 
and having to differentiate between host communi-
ties and host countries, we also take a differentiated 
approach to conflict, peace and, hence, also to peace 
processes.
Post-conflict or cyclical oscillation
We suggest that only an analytical framework 
that overcomes the classical division between pre-, 
actual, and post-conflict situations will provide valu-
able results. This means that the everyday perception 
of conflict as pathological has to be reconsidered. 
Conflict is the rule, not the exception (Coser, 1967; 
Dahrendorf, 1958). It is hard to imagine a situation 
without any conflict. Conflict can be regarded as the 
motor of change (Joas, 1996). Situations that appear to 
be harmonious are not characterised by an absence of 
conflicts but by the fact that conflicts are ignored, 
minimised, or, in the best case, resolved rather peace-
fully. As social conflict is ever present and constitu-
tive for social life, it will not be eradicated through 
conflict resolution—it will just be channelled institu-
tionally. This means that when a (violent) conflict 
that has been successfully resolved sparks up again, 
means of peaceful conflict resolution are in place and 
snap in.16  If those means are not in place, violence 
will resurrect accompanying the expression of differ-
ing interests. Thus, the concept of post-conflict needs 
to be broadened to include those situations that con-
tinue to experience significant levels of violence 
(Macrae, 1999, p. 15). Conflict situations do not pass 
directly into post-conflict situations, but undergo a 
transition without clear-cut boundaries (UNHCR, 
1999). We therefore consider the use of the concept 
16 \  This does not mean that conflicts have to be violent or unresolved. On 
the contrary, conflict resolution seems to be a driving force of differen-
tiation (Dahrendorf, 1958). But statistics show that conflict—even if 
violent—is not a non-recurring exception from the rule of sustained 
peace. This is affirmed in a comparison of recent conflicts: “There has 
been a tendency … to assume that the progression from violence to 
sustained security is fairly linear—and that repeated violence is the 
exception. But recurring civil wars have become a dominant form of 
armed conflict in the world today. Every civil war that began since 
2003 was a resumption of a previous civil war (World Bank 2011, p. 57).” 
Syria has been an infamous exception. 
According to our reading of the literature, all three 
statutory groups—IDPs, refugees, hosts—seem to be 
inextricably linked to sustainable solutions for PRS.
The final, in our view crucial, distinction con-
cerns the term protracted refugee situations (PRS). 
The focus of PRS literature is mainly on refugees. We 
see certain shortfalls in the above-cited UNHCR defi-
nition of PRS.15  The definition does not include a po-
litical or strategic dimension, fails to recognise urban 
and other unaccounted for displaced populations and 
is too static (cf. Newman & Troeller, 2008, p. 382). In 
other words, the agency of the affected individuals is, 
not acknowledged—the total number of members of 
a population of concern might, for example, remain 
stable while membership may have shifted (Loescher 
& Milner, 2008, p. 21). As the term PRS is already estab-
lished, proposing a new term risks further confusion. 
Yet, IDPs have been overlooked for too long, and the 
distinction based on statutory markers is counterpro-
ductive as just shown. We therefore propose to speak 
of situations of protracted forced displacement (PFD) 
rather than protracted refugee situations (PRS). This 
means that we define displaced persons as people 
who have been forced to leave their place of origin 
due to violent conflict and do not distinguish be-
tween those who made it across an international bor-
der or not. However, we recognise that while the 
cause of displacement is similar, the legal, political 
and social situation of IDPs differs greatly from the 
situation of refugees and that therefore distinctions 
are sometimes necessary. In addition, the fact that 
refugees and IDPs are composed of different (ethnic) 
groups that face different challenges (Rüegger & Boh-
net, 2013) must be taken into account—having ana-
lysed the entire context—when looking for tailored 
recommendations.
15 \  PRS are situations “...in which refugees [and other forcibly displaced] 
find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their 
lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, 
social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. 
A refugee [or other displaced person] in this situation is often unable 
to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance” (UNHCR 
2004b).
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The actual form of each conflict therefore de-
pends on the internal dynamics of the conflict and 
the strategies employed by international actors. Con-
sidering these dimensions when analysing protract-
ed conflict helps to avoid certain shortfalls connected 
to the differentiation of conflict and post-conflict 
that is only based on the number of killings in an 
armed conflict. Using statistics to measure whether a 
conflict is a full-scale or a limited war, a low intensity 
conflict or whether an incident is already considered 
an exception in times of post-conflict (e.g. HIIK, 2014), 
does not allow an assessment of the situation of an 
individual caught up in violence. 17
Return: A process and not the end of a cycle
The right of return is established in Article 13 (2) 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
It states: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to his country” (UN-
HCR, 1996). However, while a general agreement ex-
ists on the right of return to one’s country of origin, 
there is no such agreement on the right of return to 
one’s former home (Phuong, 2005, p. 4). As this right is 
not formally established, these issues have been tak-
en up in peace agreements, for example, in Cambodia, 
Guatemala, Sierra Leone and Burundi (Phuong, 2005, 
p. 6). Why it is of benefit to take these issues into con-
siderations can be observed in the Liberia Peace 
Agreement and its aftermath (box 3).
First, it is to be acknowledged that return does 
not mean that displaced persons return exactly to 
the same place from which they have fled. Instead 
they may settle in an entirely new area within their 
country of origin (Hammond, 2004). This can depend, 
for example, on the level of destruction of their for-
mer home, on property rights and land availability. 
Consequenty, return cannot be regarded as a simple 
reversal of displacement (UNHCR, 2008, p.1). Second, 
although return is often considered to be “the end of 
one cycle” (Black & Koser, 1999, p. 3), it is rather a new 
beginning, namely the start of reintegration. However, 
parameters for this new beginning and the under-
standing of return and reintegration are not always 
17 \  For an in-depth discussion on the difficulty of quantitative, qualitati-
ve and biased data cf. Reyna 2011.
“post-conflict” as critical and rather speak of a cyclical 
oscillation. This oscillation between so-called peace 
and war is a situation of protracted conflict. 
The Oxford dictionary defines the word “protract-
ed” as follows: “…lasting for a long time or longer 
than expected or usual.” In countries like South Su-
dan, Afghanistan or the DRC, whole generations have 
grown up within a violent context that has lasted for 
a long time. Azar (1990, p. 6ff.) pioneered a descriptive 
model that situates protracted social conflicts (PSC) 
within a framework of four factors: 
1\ international linkages (economic and political 
networks), 
2\ the role of the state, respectively the government,
3\ deprivation of human needs, and
4\ the communal content of society (identity groups 
involved). 
Box 3 
The Liberia Peace Agreement and the long-term durability 
of peace programmes
The Liberia Peace Agreement and the “Community Resettlement and 
Reintegration Strategy” of 2004 showed the importance of recognising 
the concerns of returnees. The agreement established a special body to 
co-ordinate assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons and 
returnees, the so-called International Stabilisation Force (ISF). A wide 
range of actors from civil society was integrated to represent the con-
cerns and interests of DPs and returnees on a high governmental level. 
The programme built upon finished disarmament and demobilisation 
processes. The programme was extremely successful, as the DPs went 
back home even faster than had been planned. However, the different 
treatment of IDPs and refugees remained the pressing problem during 
the repatriation process. IDPs did not receive the same support as ref-
ugees. Even though short-term goals of repatriations seemed to have 
been achieved quickly in the Liberian case, this case is also a telling 
statement about the necessity to consider long-term effects. After re-
patriations, former IDPs have faced a variety of problems that are 
similar to those of refugees. Young mothers, girls and children have 
been threatened by human rights violations, like sexual or domestic 
violence; ethnic-based conflicts about land ownership have increased in 
regions that were highly contested during civil war; adequate shelter, 
medical care or sanitation has been lacking as a big part of the infra-
structure, especially in home regions of IDPs, was destroyed during 
civil war and finally, these regions are threatened by food insecurity 
and a particularly high youth unemployment rate that hamper a com-
plete reintegration (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007.
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Macrae (1999) underlines, displaced persons can be 
pressured to return home to insecure regions. 
Although it is assumed that most displaced per-
sons want to return, several cases demonstrate the 
contrary (see, for example: Rogge, 1994, p. 31). Dis-
placed persons might not desire to return, because
   \ they belong to a minority group that still risks 
certain forms of harassment and 
discrimination, 
   \ the degree of destruction in the place of origin 
is so large that opportunities to secure a liveli-
hood are minimal or non-existent, 
   \ the circumstances that originally led to their 
forced exit were traumatic,
   \ they lack capital, 
   \ they have close ethnic ties within the host so-
ciety, or 
   \ they have better access to livelihood opportun-
ities in the host area (Crisp, 2003, p. 3-4). 
The ability of displaced persons to decide in fa-
vour or against a return depends furthermore on the 
information they can receive regarding the condi-
tions of return as well as the reliability of such infor-
mation (Black & Koser, 1999, p. 112).
The core components of voluntary repatriation 
are overall physical, legal and material safety and rec-
onciliation (UNHCR, 2004a). Recently, UNHCR has 
emphasised that beyond the principle of voluntari-
ness, return should take place under conditions of 
safety and dignity (Long, 2013b; Phuong, 2005). Yet 
there is no clear understanding of the term dignity 
(Bradley, 2007) or the question when safety is guaran-
teed. Sometimes, states put more emphasis on safety 
than on the aspect of voluntariness. Once the issue of 
safety is declared to be resolved, refugee status can be 
revoked and refugees deported (Long, 2013b). 
There is organised and there is spontaneous re-
turn. While many peace agreements that consider 
displaced persons assume that return will be organ-
ised by the international community, the majority of 
returns occur spontaneously (Adelman, 2002, p. 282). 
Some displaced persons proceed before or directly af-
ter a peace agreement, a decision that can challenge 
peacebuilding efforts (Loescher et al., 2007, p. 497). 
Furthermore, some DPs may not be registered with 
clear. Hammond, for example, points out that in the 
context of return a variety of different terms is used 
indifferently: “rehabilitation, reconstruction, rebuild-
ing, readjustment, re-adaptation, reacculturation” 
(Hammond, 1999, p. 230). This demonstrates that re-
turn can be seen as a complex process that involves 
various stages, approaches and dimensions. Peace-
building can be one of them (Long, 2013b). Third, 
there are different types of return: (i) Return within 
the country of origin, (ii) return from neighbouring 
host countries, and (iii) return from a country of re-
settlement. All returnees, however, are faced with 
similar challenges and are subject to the same princi-
ple of voluntariness.  
The principle of voluntariness and non-refoulement
Repatriation or return usually refers to voluntary 
return. As Hathaway (2005, p. 4) points out, the UN-
HCR Executive Committee only supports voluntary 
repatriation. Voluntary repatriation can be seen as a 
corollary of the principle of non-refoulment (Long, 
2013a, p. 3). As UNHCR writes in its Handbook:
The principle of voluntariness is the cornerstone 
of international protection with respect to the return 
of refugees. While the issue of voluntary repatriation 
as such is not addressed in the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion, it follows directly from the principle of non-re-
foulement: the involuntary return of refugees would 
in practice amount to refoulement. A person retain-
ing a well-founded fear of persecution is a refugee, 
and cannot be compelled to repatriate (UNHCR, 1996). 
The principle of non-refoulement demands that 
no state “expel[s] or return[s] a refugee in any man-
ner […] where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion” 
(Article 33 of the 1951 Convention). This implies that 
repatriation should not be promoted if displaced per-
sons are still at risk of persecution (Long, 2013a, p. 3). 
Yet, occasionally, some parts of the country are safe to 
return to while others are not (Jamal, 2008, p. 155). 
Voluntariness does not only mean “the absence of co-
ercion, but also the availability of choice or genuine 
alternatives” according to Long (2013b, p. 158). Yet this 
principle is not always respected in practice. As 
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international actors, it and determines the potential 
to include DPs in peace agreements.
UNHCR, which deprives them of assistance (Rogge, 
1994, p. 29). This is particularly true for many IDPs. 
Generally, UNHCR or other international organisa-
tions cannot provide any assistance to them, if not 
authorised by the national government. Moreover, 
displaced persons sometimes do not choose to follow 
the official channels of return as through identifica-
tion, they could be exposed to risks and discrimina-
tion (Rogge, 1994, p. 29). In any case, spontaneous or 
organised, all refugees have the right of return. 
Role of displaced persons for peacebuilding
Peace agreements, are often based on a linear un-
derstanding of the transition from war to peace, and 
the actors involved tend to underestimate the imple-
mentation phase of the peace agreement and all re-
lated difficulties (Stedman, 2002). Consequently, re-
turn often occurs in a situation where the conflict 
has not yet ended. In the last ten years, to the disap-
pointment of many, history has proven this point: Po-
litical peace declarations in various countries like 
Libya, Mali, the DRC, South Sudan, Yemen and Iraq 
were not accompanied by an institutionalisation of 
peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. Several se-
vere and deadly conflicts only fully escalated after the 
signing of a peace agreement and its failed imple-
mentation as e.g. the conflicts in Rwanda in 1994 and 
in Angola in 1993 have shown (Stein, 1994, p. 52). But 
even without such levels of escalation, most peace ac-
cords do not succeed in the long-term, especially if 
they fail to anticipate “post-conflict” problems, and 
also because they are used as a mere stopover by the 
warring parties (Bermudez Torres, 2005). Unlike most 
politicians and experts, civilians often pay a heavy 
price for assessing the situation incorrectly: they 
(again) lose livelihoods, investments, hopes and 
homes, get in-between the lines of warring parties or 
have to flee (again) (cf. Internal Displacement Moni-
toring Centre & Norwegian Refugee Council 2014 for 
the example of Afghanistan). 
In protracted conflicts, the rule of the stronger is 
institutionalised—not the rule of law; and times of 
peace are moments used to recover, restock and rea-
lign for the next round of hostilities. This has 
wide-ranging consequences for the question of vol-
untary return, for the individual as well as for the 
Box 4 
The Afghan peace agreement
The Afghan Peace Agreement contains no guidelines for the repatria-
tion of refugees or displaced persons (United States Institute of Peace, 
2003). Nevertheless, the issue of return is pressing and is causing ten-
sions in the region. In Pakistan, 1.7 million refugees and one million 
unregistered Afghans are suffering from growing discrimination and 
harassment. A tripartite arrangement between Pakistan, Afghanistan 
and UNHCR promotes the voluntary return of refugees to their home 
country—with limited success. Since 2002 so far 4.8 million Afghans 
have been supported to return home, while 3.8 million have remained in 
Pakistan and other countries (UN News Service, 2013). The govern-
ment of Pakistan assures that it respects the principle of voluntary 
repatriation but has also been reluctant to prolong Proof-of-Residence 
for Afghans (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2012) . This 
problem has been re-emerging despite various attempts to find a per-
manent solution.
Many refugees and IDPs in protracted conflicts 
have learned by first-hand experience to be cautious 
about political discourses concerning peace agree-
ments and ended wars (Evans, 2009; Ferris, 2015, p. 
8ff.; The World Bank Group, 2015, p. 47ff.). Their ways 
to verify such information does not necessarily coin-
cide with the flow of information of national and in-
ternational actors. Furthermore, the assessments of 
when it is safe to return may differ from the political 
discourses and the actual realities on the ground re-
garding discrimination, torture, abuse, corruption, or 
coercion, which would have a significant impact on 
the concerned individuals (cf. for the situation of 
IDPs in Afghanistan, Samuel Hall Consulting, Norwe-
gian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Moni-
toring Centre, & Joint IDP Profile Service, 2012). Never-
theless, in a few cases (e.g Sudanese refugees in 
Kakuma) refugees are allowed to go and asses the sit-
uation for themselves and to come back (cf. John, 
2010).
PRS and camps have been associated with domes-
tic insecurity in the host country, with instability in 
the country of origin and, ultimately, insecure 
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UNHCR was once established to protect refugees and 
to deal mainly with humanitarian issues, it has been 
directly involved in political matters by bringing to-
gether host and origin governments through tripar-
tite agreements (Harrell-Bond, 1989, p. 46). However, 
while refugees are sometimes mentioned in these 
agreements, their views are often not taken into ac-
count (Long, 2013b, p. 189). UNHCR regards most of its 
reintegration activities as short-term (UNHCR, 2008, 
p. 10), yet it also considers reintegration a necessity. 
This is problematic because reintegration is often a 
long process and short-term solutions are not always 
sufficient to guarantee sustainable peace and 
reintegration.
UNHCR recognises today that its responsibility 
does not end when returnees have crossed a border 
(UNHCR, 1996, p. 5). The UN General Assembly wid-
ened UNHCR’s mandate in the mid-1980s to include 
assistance for the process of rehabilitation and to 
guarantee that return is sustainable. UNHCR’s func-
tion of promoting and facilitating the voluntary repa-
triation of refugees has also been affirmed (1996 p. 6). 
UNHCR’s role has expanded in the last decade, with 
an increase in the scope of its reintegration work 
(Macrae, 1999, p. 1). Also, UNHCR has lately adopted a 
regional approach towards voluntary, safe and digni-
fied return (UNHCR, 2008, p. 5f.). 
Humanitarian actors and those involved in devel-
opment take different approaches when responding 
to protracted situations of forced displacement (Mat-
tner, 2008, p. 112). Humanitarian actors are tradition-
ally called upon in emergencies and conflict situa-
tions, while development actors assist in 
post-conflict situations. However, as outlined above, 
conflicts are often protracted and tend to erupt more 
than once. More often than not, there is no identifia-
ble clear-cut boundary between conflict and 
post-conflict. When this is the case, a division be-
tween humanitarian and development assistance 
and actors is not very helpful as the development as-
pect cannot always be differentiated from the hu-
manitarian one. UNHCR does not consider itself a 
“development agency”. Yet, more involvement in the 
reintegration process of displaced persons has result-
ed in an increased focus on development. UNHCR, in 
consequence, emphasises that reintegration 
relations between both countries (Crisp, 2000; 
Loescher & Milner, 2008, chapter one). Loescher and 
Milner (2008) underline that PRS are not only a symp-
tom, but also catalysts and triggers for renewed vio-
lence in this regard. The same is true for situations of 
protracted displacement and, most importantly, for 
return. If the causes of displacement, in particular 
ethnic tensions or land right issues, have not been 
addressed or resolved in the place of destination, re-
turn will exacerbate existing conflicts and under-
mine on-going peacebuilding efforts. Humanitarian, 
security and development actors might suddenly find 
themselves in a context in which camps become the 
turning/focal point for violence: Examples of this are 
lessons learned from Guinea, where camp residents 
from Sierra Leone became victims of attacks (Crisp, 
2003) and where, in various cases young men and 
children residing in camps were forcefully recruited 
into armed groups (Achvarina & Reich, 2006; Gates & 
Reich, 2010, p. 77ff.). In the DRC, whole Rwandan refu-
gees camps were taken hostage (Pottier, 1999, p. 147ff.; 
see box 4). There are furthermore  cases where con-
flicts had allegedly been prolonged because aid creat-
ed a safe haven for violent actors. This, in turn, caused 
military reprisal by the national or neighbouring 
army (Boutroue, 1998). 
3.3 Stakeholders and programmes
The return process involves many divergent ac-
tors with their own programmes and priorities, a fact 
that can lead to tensions between them. The country 
of origin, the host country, and the UNHCR are the 
most important actors in the process of return and 
reintegration and those with the primary responsi-
bility. In particular when government institutions 
are weak, UNHCR often takes up a leading role in the 
return process. Besides these main actors there are 
various other international, national, and regional 
stakeholders involved in the return process and in-
fluence the sustainability of return and reintegration.
The role of UNHCR 
UNHCR has become a major player in the process 
of repatriation, and it regards PRS today as a main-
stream policy priority (Jamal, 2008, p. 143). While 
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host country are fragile (Macrae, 1999, p. 28). 
In addition, the decision about whether and for 
how long a fear of persecution is well founded (and 
thus a reason for asylum) is usually made by state au-
thorities that base their decision on objective chang-
es at the macro-level in the country of origin, disre-
garding the subjective assessment of the person 
concerned (cf. Chimni, 1999, p. 6). Stein (1994, p. 52) 
goes even further, stating, “most […] repatriations oc-
cur under conflict, without a decisive political event 
such as national independence, without any change 
in the regime or the conditions that originally caused 
flight,” implying that displaced persons and return-
ees are particularly vulnerable and reintegration pro-
cesses are hindered.
But it is not only the host country that needs to 
assume its responsibility in the return process, the 
country of origin also plays a major part in the return 
process to guarantee just return and reintegration. 
According to international law, the country of origin 
has the main responsibility in the reintegration pro-
cess,. Koser (2008), too, states that the principal re-
sponsibility for guaranteeing safety and justice for 
the displaced upon return lies with the national gov-
ernment. This responsibility includes the protection 
of the displaced once they have returned, the respon-
sibility of providing them with the necessary docu-
ments for re-entering their home country and for 
travelling within the country of origin (UNHCR, 1996). 
Countries of origin do not always assume this role 
due to economic and political constraints. 18 
One also has to bear in mind that governments 
are not homogenous actors. They are composed of re-
gional and national actors, competing ministries, po-
litical parties whose national politics might result in 
opposing views and priorities that influence refugee 
policies. Sometimes, “home” governments push for 
repatriation because refugees undermine their legiti-
macy or reputation or to reduce a military threat 
stemming from exiled refugees. for instance in the 
cases of Ethiopia and Djibouti or Rwanda and the 
18 \  Statistically, countries that rank low on the Human Development 
Index (HDI) are much more likely to cause forced displacement, both 
internally and internationally. These countries are not always in a 
good position to manage the return process in accordance with inter-
national human rights. Besides, also the motives behind the demand 
for repatriation by the country of origin have to be closely scrutinised..
activities should not neglect the development per-
spective (UNHCR, 2008, p. 6). Development actors, 
such as United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), too, have lately seen the necessity to co-oper-
ate directly with humanitarian agencies, such as UN-
HCR, to address both humanitarian and development 
needs at the same time (Mattner, 2008, p. 112). 
To strengthen this co-operation, UNHCR, adopted 
a new Framework for Durable Solutions in 2003 (Mat-
tner, 2008, p. 114). Within this policy framework, UN-
HCR started the so-called 4Rs approach of repatria-
tion, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction 
(Mattner, 2008, p. 115). An inter-agency approach that 
addresses the full cycle of return and reintegration has 
to integrate and co-ordinate a larger number of agen-
cies and tasks. Experts (Lippman & Malik, 2004) point 
out that the concept is not always easily implement-
ed, as it requires the right mix of leadership, national 
ownership, flexibility, and the right tools. It is, further-
more, challenging to follow the 4Rs approach in areas 
of return where prospective partners are not present 
because they are not considered a priority for develop-
ment or reconstruction agencies (Duffield, Diagnoe, & 
Tennant, 2008, p. 12f.). “Development-oriented assis-
tance” as Krause (2012, p. 16) calls it, bridges the gap 
between relief and development and has considerable 
potential for the displaced and the hosts. It also in-
cludes the provision of aid to local communities. Al-
though Krause (2012) focusses mainly on the host 
country, her reasoning can also be applied to the re-
turn context.  
The host country and the country of origin
The role of UNHCR and its priorities depend on 
the capacities of the state as well as that of other actors, 
such as the host government, the country of origin, 
NGOs and other bilateral or multilateral agencies 
(Slaughter & Crisp, 2008). The main responsibilities of 
the host country are to respect and guarantee the 
principle of non-refoulment and to protect refugees 
according to international law and standards, includ-
ing the principle of voluntary return (UNHCR, 1996). 
However, as outlined above, host governments often 
put pressure on refugees to return. These pressures 
arise because of the unwillingness of host countries 
to fund and support DPs or because situations in the 
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crowded. This means that families may run out of 
food and subsequently of seeds (which in the DRC or 
Casamance, for instance, have to be eaten instead of 
being saved for the next planting season). Observa-
tions in the Casamance and DRC show that gender 
roles are challenged, divorces, family split ups and do-
mestic violence rises in situations of protracted con-
flict. DP families sometimes share a few square me-
tres with a dozen of people, living in poor hygienic 
conditions (Rudolf, 2012, 2014).
The above-mentioned, usually high level of soli-
darity with individual DPs in the DRC is, nevertheless, 
strained by various consequences most autochthons 
consider negative (Rudolf, 2014): As one consequence 
of massive displacement, whole neighbourhoods in 
Goma, DRC, are reported to deteriorate as more peo-
ple are cramped into less space. Prices for land and 
commodities rise while the labour market is saturat-
ed and wages are low—social cohesion diminishes. 
The development of infrastructure does not match 
the numbers of IDPs in hosting communities, and 
the subsequent increase in people living in town im-
pairs the access and quality of basic services. The lo-
cal population blames DPs in and outside of camps 
for being responsible for the increase in insecurity, 
prostitution, and intergroup hostilities while DPs ac-
cuse locals of exploitation and discrimination. This 
observation seems to be exemplary for a general pat-
tern according to various other case studies (cf. Crisp, 
2000; Davies, 2012, p. 7f.).
The same challenges and potentials can be ob-
served in the relation of returnees and locals even 
though competition on scarce resources and inter-
group tensions often have a different quality due to 
the course of conflict and its effects (see below). Just 
as it does in the integration process in the host coun-
try, the local population also plays an important role 
in the return and reintegration process. Long (2013b) 
speaks of repatriation as a “community process” that 
involves various groups of people and stakeholders. 
As Rogge underlines, the response of the local popula-
tion to the returnees is essential and determines the 
success of their reintegration. For example, “… if local 
chiefs are supportive of return, then an array of re-
sponse strategies will be available from within the 
DRC (cf. Black & Koser, 1999). In addition, as returnees 
often return to countries with weak government 
structures, their reintegration process can be difficult 
(UNHCR, 2008, p. 6), especially if the local communi-
ties are not receptive to the returnees.
The local communities
The relation between DPs and hosts is often an 
ambiguous mix of generosity and hospitality on the 
one hand and suspicion and exploitation on the oth-
er (Jacobsen & Rudolf, 2015). Even in an extremely 
long lasting conflict like that of the DRC, the level of 
solidarity with refugees and IDPs is exceptionally 
high (Simpson & Sawyer, 2010, p. 35–37). This repre-
sents a significant social capital in regard to local in-
tegration. In general it can be said that the choice of 
destination, and the likelihood of successful integra-
tion into the new location depend in part on existing 
social networks; particularly networks that were de-
veloped during other waves of displacement. Such 
networks generate integration opportunities: Accord-
ing to a comparative UNHCR study that documented 
17 hosting experiences in eleven countries, “IDPs in 
host families and communities usually find greater 
opportunities for work, business, food production, ed-
ucation and socialization, among other advantages, 
than those confined to camps“ (Davies, 2012, p. 10). 
Davies (ibid.) speaks of host families as the “silent 
NGO”. 
According to observations in the DRC, a few hosts 
profit from the presence of DPs—they take advantage 
of the fact that DPs have to sell their labour cheap or 
even for free in exchange for a place to stay, or a plot 
of ground to cultivate. Yet most of the time the econ-
omic situation of hosts deteriorates: Tensions be-
tween IDPs and host families often arise due to lack 
of resources and services, such as firewood, water, and 
sanitation facilities. This can also be seen in the case 
of Liberia where tension rose because of unequal 
treatment between returnees and stayees, i.e. the lo-
cal population. Sometimes, the source of tension is 
even more basic—too many mouths to feed. The poor-
er the household the greater the strains additional 
household members put on hosts. Malnutrition rises, 
family tensions multiply, space gets even more 
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vocational trainings, medical care, education, and by 
supporting mediation and reconciliation processes, 
etc. for an intermediate period of time. NGOs “… tend 
to have an unrivalled familiarity with local conflict 
environments and close contacts with grassroots 
movements” (Koser, 2008) and could contribute this 
expertise into the peacebuilding and reintegration 
process for the benefit of all.
community […]. If there is no support, or if local peo-
ple are hostile to the returnees, then the reintegra-
tion process will be seriously impeded” (1994, p. 46). 
Therefore, the local population also has to be includ-
ed in the return process to prevent renewed tensions 
between the returnees and stayees.
The NGOs
NGOs 19 play a monitoring role for the needs of 
the DPs and returnees and are able to sensitise re-
sponsible authorities about these needs, particularly 
in situations of spontaneous return (Rogge, 1994). Yet 
NGOs—even within the currently applied cluster sys-
tem—often face problems of co-ordination and thus 
are not always able to advocate for the needs of DPs 
effectively. Humanitarian NGOs are confronted with 
the challenge to establish protection, non-food items, 
or food programmes as quickly and as effectively as 
possible. NGOs are often attributed a corrective role 
within international aid—they are regarded to be the 
voice of civil society. Still, their work is often limited 
to care and maintaining approaches (cf. Büscher & 
Vlassenroot, 2010). Due to the framework established 
by conditions and guidelines of donors, the United 
Nations, and national regulations, NGOs are subject 
to mostly the same limitations to thinking and act-
ing outside the box as other international actors. 
Most repatriation programmes are traditionally 
confined to fulfilling immediate consumption needs 
of returnees instead of initiating development pro-
cesses (Chimni, 1999). This means that NGOs, in prin-
ciple, also suffer from the missing link between de-
velopment and humanitarian actors. Yet it is also due 
to the work of NGOs that today this is changing: Dif-
ferent, more complete, return kits are distributed, and 
often efforts are made to accompany return with the 
building of infrastructure, by providing livestock, 
19 \  NGOs are very heterogeneous and their role goes well beyond the as-
pect that is highlighted here. It should therefore be kept in mind that 
national and international NGOs act on a local, nationwide or interna-
tional level. They are embedded socially on varying degrees, yet they 
usually indeed have a catalyst, intermediary role integrating their be-
neficiaries into broader social movement (Grawert, 2009). The responsi-
bility to integrate voices of beneficiaries and to provide space for their 
participation can nevertheless not be made an exclusive obligation of 
NGOs – it should also remain a concern for governments and interna-
tional institutions.
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In other words, the question of return is mostly 
determined by conditions in the country or region of 
origin. During protracted conflicts, warlords and oth-
er entrepreneurs of violence22  manage to reallocate 
land and resources. Such allocation processes either 
directly cause displacements or take place after dis-
placements have occurred and when a third group 
profits from the situation. In both cases, persons or 
groups profit directly from displacement and would, 
in turn, see these profits diminish in the case of re-
turn. The continued interest of the ones who profit 
and their presence in the area of origin is therefore 
an obstacle to return and a cause for PFD. The shift of 
resources means that large parts of the population 
have lost their property, farmlands, cattle ranges, and 
livelihoods. Entrepreneurs of violence are able to 
maintain their claim on land and other resources, be-
cause they are still in charge, successfully lobbying 
the government, or because they are already part of 
the political elite (Reno, 1999; Simpson & Sawyer, 2010, 
p. 67ff.). 
Land rights, resources, and dynamics of violence 
The historic roots and the current political econ-
omy of conflict are decisive factors for the sustaina-
bility of any repatriation process. Some factors that 
challenge sustainability are the fact that the authori-
ty of a government or customary leader to allocate, 
manage, and defend resources is contested. A weak 
jurisdiction, too, cannot resolve disputes that arise 
from this void, and finally violent means enable ac-
tors to pursue their interest and allocate resources 
successfully (Pugh, Copper, & Goodhand, 2004; Reno, 
1999). As long as these root causes of conflict remain 
unchallenged, it is highly unlikely that repatriation 
will lead to a lasting peace. It is, on the contrary, more 
likely that the conditions will reproduce the dynam-
ics of violence. The defence of community interests, 
access to resources and land rights in such a context 
is often closely linked to the (re-)emergence of armed 
tions look for alternative income opportunities; (iii) this accelerates 
displacement in general and urbanisation in particular. Displacement 
resulting from the loss of rural income opportunities has been accele-
rating the process of urbanisation (Rudolf 2014).
22 \  The discussion about warlords, markets of violence, and rational ac-
tors in wartime is diverse and far from settled (see below). We do not 
intend to solve this debate. As a theoretical perspective it is still hel-
pful to assume that violence evolves within an internal logic of action.
The implementation of repatriation efforts can 
also be highly problematic. A particular challenge re-
patriation faces lies in the fact that numerous dis-
placements have lasted for so long that a whole gen-
eration has grown up in camps or exile. Furthermore, 
it can be difficult for aid agencies to identify return-
ees, especially those who have settled spontaneously 
and independently (Allen & Morsink, 1994, p. 22) in 
the country of return. It is also not always easy to pro-
vide assistance to and to keep track of returnees that 
move on or move back into exile. The key challenges 
identified in the literature until today will be dis-
cussed below.
4.1 Land issues, labour market, and  
urbanisation
Land rights often lie at the heart of conflict and 
displacement. Interdependencies of land governance, 
identification, and conflict have been re-emerging is-
sues across protracted conflicts and situations of PFD 
in the Global South20.  The conflicts range from dis-
putes between nations, or armed groups over fertile 
or mineral-rich areas to disputes between neighbour-
ing communities and individuals over the bounda-
ries that separate their farms or homes. At the very 
root of conflicts in various post-colonial contexts are 
often historical asymmetries in resource allocation 
and inequalities in access to land. Institutions that 
have been formed to uphold such a system exacer-
bate this misbalance: Consequently, disputes are 
more likely to be resolved by violent, extra-judicial 
means rather than through democratically legiti-
mised institutions. To exclude competitors, align al-
lies and raise group cohesion, certain interest groups 
instrumentalise ethnicity. Power and resources are 
eventually accumulated by violence (Eckert, Elwert, 
Gosztonyi, & Zitelmann, 1999; Elwert, 1999; Schlee, 
2000; von Trotha, 2004). 21 
20 \  Generalisations are always difficult as contradicting cases can usual-
ly be found. The generalisations are hypotheses that draw upon a cer-
tain number of documents consulted for this desk review—they are 
working hypothesis to be tested in the field in the study to come.
21 \  Besides the rise of violence, the population that does not opt for ar-
med resistance is affected by disputes about land and resources as fol-
lows: (i) A diminished access to land or other natural resources decrea-
ses income opportunities for herders and farmers, miners and timber 
workers, etc. significantly; (ii) in consequence, the affected popula-
4. Repatriation and Peace Agreements:  
Impact and Challenges 
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Just as before displacement, agricultural products are 
shared with family members and neighbours in the 
camp or hosting arrangement. It is due to farming 
only that many DPs are able to cope during periods of 
non-assistance, and, they take great risks to access 
their fields, as is the case in the DRC, for instance (cf. 
Simpson & Sawyer, 2010, pp. 41-43).
DPs are often reluctant to return because they do 
not want to risk a livelihood model that, according to 
their experience, is more resilient to recurring 
shocks characteristic for protracted conflicts than 
their former income generating activities. This 
means that conditions to engage in activities such as 
trade in one specific market, agriculture on one spe-
cific field, herding, mining, etc. in one specific site 
have changed. To rely on one source of income only, 
engage in one principal livelihood has made DPs too 
vulnerable in the past. DPs in exile have to bridge the 
urban–rural, host–origin, legal–illegal divide to cope 
with the pressures of PFD. The DRC is exemplary for 
this pattern: IDPs survive by adapting the division of 
work and by innovating livelihood activities. In ur-
ban areas, for example, livelihoods are volatile and 
jobs are harder to get (especially for unqualified la-
bour) due to the increased supply of manpower as a 
result of massive displacement (Alix-Garcia & Bart-
lett, 2015; Norwegian Refugee Council, 2014). Due to 
the influx of DPs, prices for commodities typically go 
up while wages go down. 23 Therefore, a majority of 
people have to depend on various revenues and di-
verse livelihoods. Households adopt several livelihood 
strategies—usually keeping their traditional liveli-
hood when possible (agricultural activities remain 
necessary in addition to a salaried job, see above)—
that are carried out by different members of the 
household. Divisions and variations of activities are 
often organised within family networks and take 
place on a rural–urban or urban–semi urban axis. 
23 \  These circumstances describe conditions in a specific place and time. 
The development of prices for commodities and houses depend on a 
variety of other factors, too. The Congolese example can nevertheless 
be regarded as exemplifying a general pattern: In Sudan e.g. prices for 
housing went up because the influx of IDPs brought with it a number 
of international NGOs who needed housing (Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and 
Saah, 2012). Research in Darfur in Sudan showed that the labour mar-
ket became saturated with low-skill workers, and that households’ we-
alth decreased in general—contrary to the fate of high-skilled workers 
whose services were more in demand than before displacements oc-
curred (Alix-Garcia and Bartlett, 2015). 
groups and so-called warlords. This situation fosters 
violence, blocks efforts of peacebuilding and makes a 
process of sustainable repatriation that addresses the 
root causes of PFD more difficult. 
Having these factors in mind, helps to better un-
derstand various stalemates and concerns of the af-
fected population in exile in regard to return: Beyond 
official peace agreements or political declarations on 
the safety of return, various other factors influence 
the decisions of displaced groups vis-a-vis so-called 
durable solutions and broader political and 
peace-making processes. These factors are property 
rights (land and other resources such as mining or 
fishing rights.) and access to justice respectively 
guarantees for these rights in the place of destination. 
For returnees, it is often difficult to find a job because 
they are discriminated against. In South Sudan, Grab-
ska observes a “…discrimination against … returnees 
by those that stayed here” ( 2014, p. 106-108). Another 
problem is that the violent actors that have caused 
displacement are often opposed to the return of DPs. 
According to UNICEF, “land occupation [in the DRC] 
is one of the major obstacles to IDP return...” (Simp-
son & Sawyer, 2010, pp. 67–68). Cases where return has 
been causing new waves of tensions are no excep-
tions. In such cases, return eventually leads to con-
flict between the displaced and local communities, as 
well as among the returnees where women, orphans 
and unaccompanied children are reported to be in a 
particularly weak position to recover property” (Koser, 
2008). 
Diversification and adaptation
The principal activity of many displaced persons 
in the least developed countries that are plagued by 
protracted conflicts—such as South Sudan, the DRC, 
Afghanistan, Colombia—prior to displacement has 
typically been agriculture. Those, who have not been 
involved directly, have either been engaged with agri-
cultural activities on a part-time basis or have been 
indirectly benefitting from activities of family mem-
bers in this field. After displacement, it is essential for 
DPs who reside outside camps and for many who live 
inside camps to include farming in their livelihood 
portfolio in order to assure that access to staple does 
not depend entirely on unreliable monetary income. 
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4.2 Gender, age and vulnerability
DPs are far from being a homogenous group. They 
are as heterogenous and diverse as the societies they 
come from. The ratio of men and women who are 
IDPs reflects that of the general population (see fig-
ure 6). It is the nature of generalisations that they do 
not necessarily reflect the fate of individuals. Situa-
tions of constraints do not eliminate agency of ac-
tors—there is, on the contrary, a high amount of crea-
tivity and inventiveness (e.g. in Africa cf. de Bruijn, 
van Dijk, & Foeken, 2001). Despite the sheer over-
whelming structural obstacles that DPs are confront-
ed with, actors develop a high level of strength and 
resilience. The challenges that boys, girls, men and 
women, elderly and vulnerable persons manage to 
adapt to require differentiated analyses and different 
responses (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2006). 
Changing roles of men and women
Conflict and displacement change the roles of 
men and women and shake the traditional balance 
(Slegh, Barker, & Shand, 2012). Men cannot perform 
their traditional role as head of family because they 
are expected to fight (and often die as a result). 
IDPs adapt to the protracted conflict with multiple 
residencies to have a foot in both the rural and the 
urban area (Rudolf, 2014). 
The DRC example shows that IDPs—even in the 
direst conditions—have a considerable amount of 
agency. Depending on the circumstances, agency can 
have different outlets. Malkki (1995) observes that 
camp residents and urban DPs had developed contra-
dicting everyday strategies in regard to identification 
and integration, return and assimilation. If the geog-
raphy allows it, DP’s activities often transcend inter-
national borders. They furthermore, try to acquire 
dual citizenship or disguise their status to assure in-
dependent livelihoods (Daley, 2013). Illicit activities 
may also grow considerably in camps or urban settle-
ments of DPs, especially drug and alcohol production/
trade, smuggling, small arms trade, gang criminality, 
and prostitution. These behaviours are mostly a re-
sponse to lack of assistance and limited access to in-
come-generating activities (cf. Simpson & Sawyer, 
2010, p. 41).  
Figure 6  
Disaggregated data: Sex of IDPs by region
Source: IDMC, Norwegian Refugee Council 2015, p. 13)
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these factors and to individually tackle one by one.
The problematic situation of women (cf. Bouta, 
Frerks and Bannon, 2005) that has to be addressed in 
repatriation programmes is embedded in the larger 
social context of a gendered division of labour. Wom-
en are particularly vulnerable when they have to pro-
vide for a family alone. The status of single mothers, 
as a consequence of the conflict, varies according to 
the region the woman lives in, her ethnicity, religion, 
and status. Women in the Global South often have a 
higher workload and fewer rights than men (cf. Bouta, 
Frerks and Bannon, 2005). They are often not entitled 
to inherit or own land, they have lower levels of edu-
cation and are less well informed about their rights. 
They are less likely to pursue their civil rights—partly 
because they generally do not hold legal documents 
(birth or marriage certificates, etc.). Traditionally, 
women are engaged in activities, with high security 
risks, such as fetching water or firewood. Women and 
girls who are raped are often discriminated against. 
They may be abandoned by their families, having to 
bring up their children alone. All these structural dis-
criminatory practices exacerbate their suffering dur-
ing PFD and hamper the integration of women in the 
labour market back home.
Assessing vulnerable groups
Age is also an important factor in defining the 
vulnerability of individuals in situations of PFD as 
the specific needs of elderly persons and children need 
to be addressed during repatriation. In conflict, chil-
dren suffer in manifold ways: they are made orphans, 
child soldiers, they are traumatised victims whose 
families were killed, whose schools were burnt, and 
whose future has been stolen (Mooney & French, 2005; 
Oh, 2011; UNHCR, 2005-2007). Many children in con-
flicts/ situations of PFD work from an early age to 
support their families. Yet, being outside the custody 
of schools or families is often very risky for children. 
Just as women, children are less likely to know and 
demand their civil and human rights. Special pro-
grammes addressing the needs of children are therefore 
obligatory. Besides children, it is the elderly who also 
show high levels of vulnerability. They are hard hit by 
the loss of land and relatives—both often the only re-
liable social support systems for elderly persons. 
Women, who assume the role of father and mother in 
consequence, take on more responsibilities, diversify 
their activities, and contribute more to the family 
than before. On the one hand, this has a positive im-
pact on the economic situation, personal freedom, 
and social independence for these women. Yet this 
challenges the position of men upon their return 
from fighting, and they have difficulties to live up to 
their expected social duty, which, in turn has dramat-
ic effects on the relation between the two sexes (cf. 
Bannon & Correia, 2006). Several reports note a rise in 
domestic violence, divorces, and broken families in 
situations of PFD (Eriksson Baaz & Stern, 2010; Rudolf, 
2012; UN Women, 2006). Also, gender-related cultural 
norms may change during exile, and this may com-
plicate reintegration after return. For example, when 
South Sudanese refugee women returned, they were 
beaten up by police for wearing “tight trousers, mi-
ni-skirts and fitted t-shirts” (Grabska, 2014, p. 4), as in 
exile instead of traditional long skirts as in South 
Sudan. 
The image of men and that of masculinity has be-
come more and more nuanced in conflict research. 
Attention used to be directed towards men as perpe-
trators, but more recently, men as victims of violence 
have also come into the focus (Bannon & Correia, 
2006; Slegh et al., 2012). Men traditionally have to pro-
vide for the family. Men are expected to act as the 
head of family households, a position that is based on 
the command over land, livestock and other resourc-
es. Due to this arrangement, men have a lot to lose 
when they are displaced, as the example of Afghan 
refugees shows. It is extremely difficult for them to 
uphold their position and status after displacement 
(Schetter, 2012). The situation is aggravated by the 
constraints of a life in displacement (cf. Rudolf, 2012). 
Most Western donors usually focus on women’s 
vulnerability, and aid programs habitually address 
their special situation in PFD (cf. Carpenter, 2005). 
These programmes unfortunately do not always ad-
dress women’s concerns as embedded in a larger 
(gender) context and thus worsen the imbalance be-
tween men and women (cf. Porter & Sweetman, 2005). 
Beyond any doubt, age and gender play important 
roles in regard to the impact of displacement on peo-
ple’s vulnerabilities. The challenge is to disaggregate 
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4.3 Security, homeland and social 
change
Besides return and reintegration, security is an-
other major challenge for situations of PFD. Three 
main sources of insecurity have been identified in the 
forced displacement literature on return until today: 
the security situation 1) in the host region of dis-
placed persons; 2) of the passage of return for dis-
placed persons and 3) once the displaced persons 
have returned. These three are, however, often inter-
linked and cannot always be clearly separated.
Because of fear of rising insecurity in the host 
country, host governments, for example in Kenya, try 
to encourage refugees to return (cf. Crisp, 2000). Forc-
ing displaced persons to return before the conflict 
has subsided in their home region might expose the 
returnees to insecurity again and might eventually 
re-ignite the conflict. Thus fears of insecurity in the 
host region can be linked to insecurity in the home 
region. Insecurity in the DRC, for instance, is no ab-
stract likelihood, but first-hand experience of abuse, 
rape, mutilation, and torture for persons of every age 
and gender. Indeed, protracted conflict in this region 
also means that the traumatising experience of loss 
is repeated over and over again: Houses are burnt, 
livestock killed, harvest lost, stock looted, household 
items stolen, money and goods are given to armed 
groups in order to save lives or to spare children from 
recruitment. Resources and opportunities to re-estab-
lish livelihoods diminish after each incident. Future 
prospects to recover dwindle in consequence: Seeds 
kept for the next season are eaten during the mo-
ments of crisis. Fields are not cultivated due to the in-
security. Charcoal cannot be produced and sold for 
extra cash due to the insecurity in the forest. Recur-
rent waves of violence lead to recurrent waves of dis-
placement. This DRC-specific context is, with nuanc-
es, exemplary for many other protracted conflicts. As 
outlined in section 3.3, people often return before safe-
ty is guaranteed, although they should not. Moreover, 
who decides when it is safe? The perception of safety 
can vary between actors and can depend on their ob-
jectives. In 2014, less people returned than in previ-
ous years (cf. figure 7). One reason could have been the 
perceived lack of security in the place of origin. 
Age, just like gender, cannot be per se be equated 
with vulnerability or a low level of agency—these fac-
tors have to be interrelated with others. Still, both age 
and gender have to be addressed adequately as these 
vulnerable groups are often less able to raise their voice 
than others. The social changes that occurred during 
or after a situation of displacement considering the 
identity, self-image, sense of belonging, or social role 
of individuals are crucial for integration and reinte-
gration perspectives for DPs. Displacement is a dy-
namic process of social change that cannot simply be 
reversed (e.g. by sending young urban refugees back 
to their homeland to take up agricultural livelihoods). 
Urban DPs are largely ignored yet a significant num-
ber of refugees stays in urban areas (18 per cent com-
pared to 28 per cent who live in camps) (Jacobsen, 
2006). This does not include IDPs, and in all likelihood 
the number is even higher than estimated. 
Programmes for DPs have to be able to look be-
yond cross-cutting categories such as age and gender. 
Those categories do not constitute needs per se. There 
must be a differentiated assessment of needs accord-
ing to the situation, to protect the most vulnerable 
individuals. Otherwise, such programmes threaten to 
undermine successful repatriation measures in the 
long run—cf. the above-mentioned Liberian case. A 
generalisation of the role of young women, for exam-
ple, is not always helpful as they may not only be a 
mother but may, according to local gender perspec-
tives, belong to different categories with different 
rights and roles. Children and the elderly, who have 
to depend on others, are also a separate category. In 
most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, young 
men often constitute a different category than older 
men, as working and earning a living is usually con-
sidered the crucial distinctive feature of manhood. As 
individuals who are not fully integrated into society 
as (social) adults, the young men are therefore more 
at risk of engaging in violent conflict as they aim to 
achieve manhood, or social adultness. Criminal 
armed gangs recruit young men today for illegal 
activities simply because they are available and can-
not find other sources of income. This can create situ-
ations of insecurity and cause another challenge for 
PFD and return (e.g. Sierra Leone, see Fanthorpe & 
Maconachie, 2010; Peters & Richards, 1998)
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camps. DPs (i) are exploited as cheap manpower, for 
legal and illegal activities (cf. Chalamwong, 
Thabchumpon and Chantavanich, 2013; Norwegian 
Refugee Council, 2014; Rudolf, 2014), (ii) are used to re-
cruit, hide and nurse members of armed groups (Ach-
varina and Reich, 2006; Choi & Salehyan, 2013; Crisp & 
Jacobsen, 1998), (iii) can be taken as hostages (cf. 
Boutroue, 1998; Pottier, 1999), and (iv) guarantee the 
influx of benefits from (inter)national aid (cf. Barber, 
1997; Büscher and Vlassenroot, 2010; Macrae, 1999). Yet 
camp residents cannot be seen as mere victims, their 
role is ambiguous, as they are both suffering from 
and creating these conditions. 
It is thus certain that there will be a strong resist-
ance to change from actors who benefit from illicit 
activities, distortions, etc. Any risk assessment before 
a planned repatriation has to consider the entire so-
cio-economic and political context in areas of origin 
and of displacement. Otherwise, resistance from ben-
eficiaries of land-grabs and all individuals who fear 
that they can no longer exploit resources in the area 
of origin as well as from persons whose established 
profit margins in the host country could be chal-
lenged will be unforeseen and unaccounted for. Other 
factors that have to be taken into account are that the 
area of return could have been used as retreat areas 
and safe haven for armed groups, or that after demo-
bilisation, formerly opposed groups have to live to-
gether. Taking these elements of mediation and rec-
onciliation into consideration could possibly help to 
foresee arising tensions between the stayees and 
returnees. 
Returnees in the place of origin
This third issue of insecurity related to return 
has been particularly emphasised by the DDR litera-
ture (see, for example: Conoir and Verna, 2006), al-
though refugee and conflict scholars recently also 
have underlined that refugee return could create se-
curity implications. Within the project at PRIO “Go-
ing Home to Fight? Explaining Refugee Return and 
Violence” led by Kristian Hapviken24 , Lischer (2011), 
for example, shows for Rwanda that previously 
24 \  See, for more information: https://www.prio.org/Projects/Projec-
t/?x=843, extracted on 5 June 2015.
Insecurity in in the place of refuge
The fact that refugees can cause security con-
cerns in the host country if not adequately addressed 
has lately been pointed out in the refugee literature 
(Bohnet, 2015; Rüegger, 2013; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 
2006). Refugees are no longer regarded as victims of 
insecurity but as threats to security (cf. Mogire, 2011; 
Muggah, 2006). Not least since the Rwanda refugee 
crisis in the 1990s, refugee scholars and policymakers 
alike have indicated that refugees could cause nega-
tive externalities and militarisation (cf. Lebson, 2013; 
Lischer, 2005). Because of concerns of rising insecuri-
ty in the host countries, displaced persons, especially 
those in PFD, are therefore often regarded through “a 
security prism”. Refugees are, consequently, not wel-
comed and thus, host governments no longer pro-
mote local integration but return as a solution.
Entrepreneurs of violence profit from the PFD sit-
uations in the area of origin and in the place of ref-
uge: Besides the allocation of resources and the force-
ful recruitment of manpower in the area of origin 
(see above), violent actors benefit wherever a culture 
of threat and intimidation is combined with an ab-
sence of rule of law (Rudolf, 2012, 2013). Once patterns 
of violent appropriation become internalised by indi-
viduals, they influence perpetrators and victims alike. 
The residents are victims of crime that plagues their 
Figure 7  
Number of refugee returns from 2010 to 2014
Source: UNHCR
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identification with an ethnic group or the homeland 
of such groups in PFD is likely to change.
Especially for generations that have spent large 
parts of their life in exile, the concept of ‘home’ is not 
straightforward. “It is intimately linked to concepts 
of identity and memory as much as territory and 
place. Home can be made, re-made, imagined, re-
membered or desired; it can refer as much to beliefs, 
customs or traditions as physical places or buildings. 
Most important, as a concept it is something that is 
subject to constant reinterpretation and flux, just as 
identities are renegotiated (Black, 2002, p. 126).
Identity and belonging
Home usually includes more than a physical lo-
cation: It can be a community associated with that 
place (Bakewell, 1999), it might be a location within 
the country of origin, or a group of persons, it might 
even be a viable national economic base anywhere in 
the world (Koser and Black, 1999, p. 7). Meanings of 
home change over time. The places referred to as 
home change, too: “The home country and its society 
may have changed beyond all recognition and [the 
refugees] themselves will have been changed during 
their exile” (Bakewell, 1999, p. 3). Home, belonging 
and identification are closely related concepts: “The 
scale at which home is defined may be manipulated 
according to the identity with which it is to be asso-
ciated, and the extent of power held by the person or 
group that is defining it” (Black, 2002, p. 127). 
DPs are in a position similar to migrants—they 
are detached more and more from the country of ori-
gin and at the same time exposed more and more to 
the realities of the host country. This also means that 
the conditions in exile, the relations to compatriots 
in camps or local settlements and to the host com-
munity shape their image of home, ideas about be-
longing, and ultimately the identity? of each individ-
ual (Bakewell, 1999, p. 3-4). Research has proven that 
time changes the attitude towards the “homeland”. 
Especially second-generation refugees are unlikely to 
want to return (Chimni, 1999). PFD situations are de-
fined as putting the individual into a state of limbo, 
meaning that it is difficult for DPs to decide on the 
militarised refugees could engage in political vio-
lence upon return. She demonstrates that the nega-
tive impact of refugee return depends on the “mecha-
nism of socialisation, defined as transformative 
learning and the development of worldviews” (Lis-
cher, 2011, p. 261). However, her study, as well as others, 
has mainly been focussing on militarised refugee sit-
uations in exile, but not on those returnees coming 
from no previous experience of fighting. Consequent-
ly, gaps remain in understanding the role of return-
ees in peace processes. More needs to be known about 
the way in which they destabilise or stabilise the 
process.
Ethnic minority return has received some atten-
tion in the refugee literature and has been argued to 
cause insecurity of returnees (cf. Adelman, 2002). It 
has been recognised that power relations of ethnic 
groups, and ethnic relations between refugees and lo-
cal populations are important for determining the 
risk of conflict (cf. Rüegger, 2013). Yet the question 
how returnees fit into the picture has not been ana-
lysed in much detail. Nevertheless, it has been recog-
nised that returning people to areas where they are 
marked as ethnic minorities or have little prospect of 
reintegration can generally be problematic and con-
stitutes a break of the UNHCR guidelines (Black and 
Koser, 1999; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). 
Nonetheless, for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina, mi-
nority return was specifically promoted as a means to 
“right the wrong” of “ethnic cleansing” (Black, 2006, p. 
28). UNHCR’s ‘open cities’ project specifically reward-
ed areas that encouraged minority return with addi-
tional aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNHCR, 1997: 21, 
quoted in Black, 2002, p. 131).
Since “Yugoslavia,” many conflicts are said to 
have been caused by deep ethnic hatred. This so-
called primordial argumentation assumes that eth-
nic identities and antagonisms between such ethnic 
groups are fixed and that after the Cold War, the lid 
was taken off these boiling tensions and ethnic wars 
re-emerged (Wimmer, Goldstone, Horowitz, Joras & 
Schetter, 2004). Contrary to this assumption, ethnic 
identities have proven to be changing and (to a cer-
tain degree) flexible. This means that over time the 
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Repatriation programmes often leave it open, which 
kind of unit returnees are meant to reintegrate into. 
This neglect of the differences in understandings of 
home is one of the key underlying causes of manifold 
difficulties faced in repatriation programmes (Black, 
2002, p. 124). 
level of integration in everyday life: Which language, 
which school system, which education, vocational 
training, which base for an enterprise, which busi-
ness model, network etc. should be pursued—the one 
of the home country or the one of the host? Experi-
ences during displacement and in the host country 
transform social and economic relationships, gender 
roles, and others, and have an impact on the case of 
return (see above and Lopez Zarzosa, 1998). 
The concept “homeland” 
The fluidity of the concept of “home” is opposed 
to the idea that all DPs have the will to return. Sur-
veys among refugees found out that “the more dis-
tant ‘home’ is in time or space, or the more unlikely 
or impractical a return ‘home’ might be, the stronger 
that group’s identification with, and yearning for, such 
a return becomes” (Black, 2002, p. 126). This glorification 
is “based on nostalgia for a past that cannot be recre-
ated” (Bakewell, 1999, p. 4). As with migrants or dias-
pora groups around the world, this point of reference 
is crucial for the notion of belonging and the enduring 
identification of community members. Various ex-
amples in history and current migrant studies show 
the gap between expectations and experiences in re-
gard to return. Black stresses that policymakers should 
therefore evaluate the discourse of DPs cautiously.
After secession wars, people may be expected to 
return to newly founded countries they have never 
lived in before (former Yugoslavia, Eritrea) (Black & 
Koser, 1999). Malkki (1995) observed in her study on 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania that those in camps 
created a myth of the Hutu nation in exile and await-
ed their return to their land while those who self-set-
tled in a Tanzanian border town integrated well and 
denied their Burundian origins (quoted in Bakewell, 
1999, p. 3f.). This example shows the ambiguity of 
homeland and group identities, which usually have 
become strongly politicised throughout the conflict 
and forced displacement (cf. forced reditribution of 
ethnically mixed populations like in former Yogusla-
via, Black, 2002, p. 125). Not always do repatriation pro-
grammes address intergroup dynamics. They usually 
focus assistance on the individual or household level. 
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Political and economic factors
On the political level, the stability of the govern-
ment in the country of return, its presence and ability 
to effectively provide security and establish the rule 
of law in the area of return affect the success of repa-
triation. Sustainability depends, in other words, on 
the capability of governments to enforce the state’s 
monopoly of violence, to frame the legal conditions 
for resolving land disputes and inequalities that 
preceded displacement, guarantee justice and make 
perpetrators accountable (Bradley, 2013, p. 2). Analysts 
stress that endurable solutions to PFD cannot be 
found by ignoring the political realm: On the contra-
ry: political solutions are required to solve the causes 
of PRS (UNHCR, 2004b, p. 4).
Besides the political settings, the economic con-
ditions in the country of return play a decisive role 
for return: DPs base their decision to return or to stay 
to a large degree on the possibility of being able to 
successfully rebuild their livelihoods. In this regard, 
return is not different from any other migration—in-
dividual cost–benefit analysis has a great impact on 
the choice of DPs to return or not. This is underlined 
by analyses that have shown how positive change in 
Based on the review of existing literature, the fol-
lowing two sections provide an overview of the fac-
tors that have commonly been assigned a central role 
in the return process. These considerations can be di-
vided into factors that precede the actual return (5.1), 
and factors that are thought to be significant for the 
success of the return process (5.2).
5.1 Preconditions for return 
The preconditions for sustainable repatriation 
and return in general are manifold: political, econ-
omic and social factors in the host country and the 
country of origin, the level of assets and resources 
that the returnees are able to mobilise (cf. Cassarino, 
2004 - figure 8), the level of willingness (cf. 4.3.), the 
level of integration respectively discrimination of 
displaced persons in exile or the level of distrust and 
hostilities after return play a decisive role. This argu-
mentation can also be seen in figure 8 below. An im-
portant lesson from past experiences (cf. 3.2.) is that 
any of these factors can undermine the success of 
peace agreements and repatriation programmes (cf. 
3.3). 
5. Practical Insights:  
Conditions and Consequences of Return
Figure 8  
Return preparation
Source: Cassarino, 2004, p. 271
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Repatriation versus return
Many policymakers neglect the question of how 
DPs evaluate these issues. Policymakers often believe, 
in parallel to a linear understanding of peace process-
es, that return is the end of a process (cf. above). They 
therefore use repatriation and return mostly synony-
mously instead of defining the former as a third party 
driven/organised/managed process and the latter as 
an open development in which the returnee defines 
start, destination, or end. There is not only a termino-
logical distinction between repatriation as a change 
from one statutory level or one side of the border to 
another, and return as a process that is defined by the 
returnee. Repatriation is a clearly defined programme 
that is implemented top-down. According to this con-
cept, any return to the host country can only be re-
garded as a failure of repatriation. If return is, in con-
trast, not confined by such a linear logic, a new 
evaluation perspective will come into play: Return 
becomes an option that needs to be rebuilt. Invest-
ments (in vocational trainings) that are related to re-
turn; education of children in the school system that 
corresponds to the area of origin, or vice versa, the de-
cision to opt for multiple residencies and split the 
family members strategically into different countries, 
the caution to let only a part of a household return 
first, the attempts to seek multiple identities, etc.—all 
these factors can be evaluated as components to 
build up resilience, diminish dependencies and avoid 
being trapped in the dichotomy of return or exile. 
5.2 Factors influencing the outcomes of 
return
Yet, even though they are sometimes disguised as 
humanitarian, refugee policies are mostly deter-
mined by non-humanitarian objectives (Chimni, 1999, 
p. 3). This means that policies are mostly determined 
by considerations about national protection, econ-
omic interests of governments (host and return coun-
tries), and to a significant degree also by the interest 
of donors. The result is in an implicit bias towards 
the negotiation of interstate agreements (on borders, 
peace, truce, etc.), conditionalities, and technicalities 
the destination areas has an impact on the will to re-
patriate: According to Wilson and Nunes (1994, p. 22ff.), 
the general reconstruction of the country of return 
(in this case Mozambique), especially its economic 
regeneration, has a much larger impact on repatria-
tion than repatriation assistance to individual house-
holds offered by the UNHCR. 
Socio-cultural factors
Even though political and economic conditions 
are held to influence the sustainability of return (cf. 
figure 8), social factors might be even more decisive: 
There are strong indications that the agency of re-
turnees plays an important role. For example, educa-
tion and social capital of returnees are said to be 
more critical for the decision of DPs to return than is 
usually acknowledged (Stefanovic, Loizides and Par-
sons, 2015). Crucial are, in addition, the level of emo-
tional attachment, the actual degree of rule of law, 
and the quality of reconciliation in/ to the area of re-
turn. All these factors have an impact on the will to 
return to the homeland (cf. above). Return is a pro-
cess and is not finished when crossing an interna-
tional border or arriving at one’s former place of resi-
dence. According to the experience of many DPs, it 
may involve several cycles of movement and lead to 
circular migration with processes of secondary or 
even multiple displacements and re-returns to sever-
al places (cf. above). 
DPs will try to gradually build up livelihoods after 
having assessed the odds of success. They usually rely 
on information provided by their own social net-
works. Decisive for the commitment to return is 
therefore the level of security, basic services, econ-
omic infrastructure and potential as perceived by DPs. 
The returnees have to trust in a just implementation 
of the peace agreement and the reconciliation pro-
cess (Mander, 2007; Sesay, 2007; Staub, 2006; Theidon, 
2006). As disputes over land and resources are usually 
a major driver of displacement, the question in how 
far these drivers have been addressed is vital for the 
prospects to regain livelihoods, political rights, and a 
life without fear (Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012; Hug-
gins, 2010; Huggins & Clover, 2005).
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have been the principal source or catalyst for conflict 
rather than a mere consequence” (Loescher & Milner, 
2008, p. 5). Instead of a feed and shelter approach 
most experts recommend an assisted self-reliance 
approach for the DPs that is accompanied by visible 
benefits for the host country/communities, such as 
basic services and infrastructure and an approach to 
repatriation that takes security, property and recon-
ciliation issues in the area of return seriously. 
Insights on the displacement–peace nexus
As outlined in 2.3., the displacement–peace nexus 
is contested and has thus not yet been sufficiently ad-
dressed in the literature. Nevertheless, some few in-
sights can be drawn from the existing literature. As 
can be seen from the example in Liberia, the inclu-
sion of refugees in peace agreements in not leading 
to a long-lasting peace unless IDPs and the local pop-
ulation are also involved. Excluding certain groups 
from reintegration programmes often creates a feel-
ing of inequality and raises tensions between those 
taking part and those who are not taking part (Speck-
er, 2007). In addition, the composition of groups of dis-
placed persons can play a significant role. In particu-
lar, the return of ethnic minorities can increase the 
risk of new conflict (Adelman, 2002). It has also been 
pointed out that returning people without having re-
solved the issues that led to displacement in the first 
place can undermine peacebuilding efforts (Black, 
2006, p. 27). Moreover, forced return can further desta-
bilise the peace process (Bradley, 2013, p. 6). If DPs re-
turn voluntarily, the success of reintegration and re-
turn is generally more likely. The Rwandan peace 
agreement has shown that lasting peace only works 
if a regional approach is taken and if host and origin 
countries co-operate with each other (cf. box 2). Also 
neglecting intra-and intergroup dynamics of return-
ees can hinder successful reintegration and the peace 
process (Black, 2002) while assisting returnees in the 
reintegration process could prevent future tensions 
(Koser, 2008). For the overall success of return, the 
time and experience in exile may play a significant 
role (Black and Gent, 2006). It is certain that reinte-
gration is hardly ever sustainable if livelihood oppor-
tunities at the location of return are lacking. So, still 
of repatriation whereby humanitarian needs are 
largely neglected and rendered objectives of short-
term interventions. The effects of the structural ad-
justment programmes of the 1980s, which forced 
poor countries to reduce social public spending and 
thereby cut the most basic social services, created 
conflict potential and thus suboptimal conditions for 
refugee return. The protracted and repeated displace-
ment coupled with diminishing resources put com-
munities under pressure and generated negative per-
ceptions and resentments between groups. This in 
turn fuels social, in particular ethnic tensions that 
undermine peaceful cohabitation and increase the 
risks for future conflicts and violence (e.g. Liberia: 
Højbjerg, 2012; Great Lakes Region: Lemarchand, 
2004; Prunier, 2008).
A UN Secretary General report of 1998 therefore 
called for “peace friendly adjustment programmes” 
and pleaded to ease conditionality on loans (UN 1998). 
Experts underline that it is up to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) donor governments to 
create “macro-conditions” that are conducive to 
peace, development and thus, potentially, for refugee 
return (Chimni, 1999). They also suggest that the con-
ditions in exile, specifically the degree of self-reliance 
of refugees, are the most important variables influ-
encing reintegration (Wilson & Nunes, 1994). The ex-
perience of displacement and the subsequent strug-
gle to survive has often led to an increase in 
vocational skills, social competences, trade networks 
and a diversification of livelihood activities (Rudolf, 
2014). These adaptation processes could be fostered. In 
this context, another lesson learned that is highlight-
ed in the literature, is to avoid a feed and shelter or 
care and maintenance approach (Milner and 
Loescher, 2011, p. 15) and so-called warehousing, a 
practice where refugees are kept in protracted situa-
tions of restricted mobility and are denied to work 
(Smith, 2004). It is a safety risk and a potential source 
for conflict in camps, host countries and neighbour-
ing regions. If neglected, PFD in general and PRS in 
particular are, in other words, eventually future secu-
rity risks: “protracted refugee situations are a driving 
force of ongoing grievances, instability and insurgen-
cy. In some cases protracted refugee situations … may 
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In sum, this desk study shows that any solution 
to protracted IDP and refugee situations requires an 
integrated approach to peacebuilding, humanitarian 
aid and development aid. For a comprehensive and 
holistic solution, development and security projects 
have to foster positive and counter negative effects of 
PFD situations (Jacobsen, 2002). “Actors within the in-
ternational protection regime and in development, 
political affairs and peacebuilding must recognize 
that the resolution of PRS is not a marginal but an in-
tegral part of security and state stability, and goes 
well beyond the humanitarian realm” (Newman and 
Troeller, 2008, p. 380). Yet, regarded from a less norma-
tive perspective, namely in the wider context of mi-
gration in the search for better opportunities, return 
is but one among various options DP consider 
(Bakewell, 1999). In the light of aforementioned fac-
tors, it can be concluded that local integration, reset-
tlement and repatriation/ return shouldnot be re-
garded as mutually exclusive while, in effect, one can 
support and complement the others. 
no answer is in sight that may answer the question of 
which activities and programmes are most success-
ful in which context. 
Bringing relief and development efforts together
An additional, albeit more fundamental insight 
that scholars nowadays largely agree upon, is the 
need to bring relief and development efforts together 
in order to achieve sustainable PFD policies. PFD situ-
ations are often approached with short-term inter-
ventions such as quick impact projects (QIPs)25  and 
“emergency relief projects” implemented by UNHCR 
or humanitarian NGOs. However, neither UNHCR nor 
NGOs are in a position to address the structural econ-
omic problems in the host countries or in the coun-
tries of origin alone. Their involvement is too limited 
both in terms of their mandate and in terms of a 
long-term commitment (Chimni, 1999). In contrast, 
development agencies are in a much better position 
to foster the potentials of repatriation and thus attain 
sustainable development (Hammond, 1999). If they 
co-operated with humanitarian agencies, return 
could thus be made more sustainable. 
Research has shown that the type and the man-
agement of settlements for returnees, as well as the 
extent and type of assistance made available play a 
role for short-term success of repatriation (Black & 
Koser, 1999). “Repatriation programmes based on a 
simplistic idea of refugees returning home are likely 
to prove ineffective and inefficient” (Bakewell, 1999, p. 
1). Such programmes seem to be driven by the hope to 
end the refugee problem through repatriation. One of 
the reasons for their failuremay be that they do not 
acknowledge the process dimension of return. Few 
studies examine long-term effects of repatriation 
programmes. This is partly due to the nature of hu-
manitarian work (rapid response) and the lack of 
co-ordination with development aid, partly due to 
the fact that return happens spontaneously and of-
ten under conflict (Stein, 1994). Those studies that 
look at long-term impacts stress the empirical diffi-
culties to deliver correct assessments (Fransen and 
Kuschminder, 2012). 
25 \  Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, low-cost projects that 
are planned and implemented within a short timeframe according to 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of 
Field Support (2012).
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approach for DPs in camps. Such a statutory ap-
proach differentiates between IDPs, hosts, refugees, 
returnees, etc., which is problematic if, as a result of 
inadequate vulnerability assessments and selective 
assistance, divisions and tensions between hosts and 
DPs are created. It is also problematic that most fund-
ing is invested in camps as it creates pull factors for 
the DPs that make it hard to foster opportunities for 
self-reliance and durable solutions for displaced pop-
ulations (cf. Rudolf, 2014). Aid agencies are struggling 
to address these shortfalls, to avoid them or to find 
exit strategies, partly because adequate theoretical 
tools are missing.
The complexity of PRS, repatriation and post-conflict
Two issues determine the risk for misperceptions 
on best solutions for PFD settings: One is the contest-
ed adequacy of existing definitions and concepts. The 
other can be summarised as a lack of understanding 
of the numbers of return, which, in turn, gives rise to 
contesting interpretations and resulting policy choic-
es. The question whether existing conceptual tools 
and definitions are still adequate to grasp the reali-
ties and complexity of PFD situations, return and 
peace processes is fundamental, because concepts 
and definitions determine researchers’ and policy-
makers’ frames of reference and scope of 
interpretations. 
What is acknowledged as reality has often been 
fixed in legal frameworks or conceptual approaches. 
These, however, have not been adjusted to empiric de-
velopments and lessons learned in PFD, conflict and 
peacebuilding settings. We, for example, have high-
lighted above (cf. 3.1) that UNHCR’s definition of PRS 
is problematic in this regard. To address such situa-
tions adequately, many renowned PRS specialists, 
such as Loescher and Milner demand a revision of 
the common PRS definition. Such a revision should 
include “dispersed or urban” refugees (Loescher & 
Milner, 2008, Ch. 2). Furthermore, the statutory lens 
through which PFD is viewed, has largely disregarded 
trans-local life-realities of population groups (Mon-
sutti, 2008) such as traditionally mobile people, i.e. 
nomads (e.g. Afghanistan’s Kuchi, cf.Foschini, 2013) 
and peripatetic [nomadic] groups like the Jogi, Chori 
We departed from the working hypothesis that 
the participation of displaced persons (refugees and 
IDPs) in peace processes is a crucial factor for their 
sustainable reintegration. Moreover, we assume that 
a clarification of the link between return and peace 
in general could yield significant insights for practic-
es that help end PFD. This desk study indicates that 
the process dimension of return and its nexus with 
peace has not been sufficiently researched until now. 
This section seeks to summarise the gaps and blind 
spots in research (6.1.) and to subsequently sketch 
out areas of further inquiry that we consider impor-
tant for a better understanding of the interrelation 
between displaced persons and peace processes (6.2.).
Finding the right criteria for assessing the sus-
tainability of reintegration and of peace is still an 
open issue. Is sustainability the more likely the more 
displaced persons are included in peace processes? 
Can it be measured by the numbers of representatives, 
the equitable composition and the participation of 
concerned groups and stakeholders, or by the level of 
their influence in peace processes? Who speaks for 
the DPs? Which level of participation is appropriate 
for the varying types of peace processes? When would 
their presence hamper peace agreements? How can 
their demands be integrated effectively into peace 
processes? Should displaced persons be included di-
rectly or indirectly in this peace process? Is reintegra-
tion of returnees sustainable if they do not need to 
flee again from where they settled? All these ques-
tions will still have to be answered if one wants to 
fully understand the role displaced persons play in 
peace processes and to see how they can contribute 
to strengthening peace processes,.
Gaps in research and  
blind spots of practice
Certain shortfalls of projects that assist refugees 
are caused by constraints of the mandate and the 
practical approach of aid agencies. It has been point-
ed out that reactions by the international community 
to PFD have often been confined to emergency re-
sponses (cf. 5.2), have overlooked hosting arrange-
ments in urban areas, and have used a statutory 
Conclusion: Bringing Displaced Persons and Peace 
Processes Together
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26 The interdependency of peacebuilding and return is 
thus still largely under-researched. The question 
whether and how DPs can participate in peace pro-
cesses and to what end is also largely unanswered. It 
is in particular unknown under which conditions the 
participation of DPs in peace agreements matters for 
the outcome of such agreements, peace processes and 
return in general. Indeed, it is not clear how DPs can 
be included in the various stages of peace processes. 
Should their participation start at the beginning of 
the negotiation of peace agreements? Should they be 
represented in transitional political bodies so that 
their needs are included in the implementation of 
policies of return and reintegration is ensured? 
Due to the statutory approach, the link between 
PFD and peacebuilding has only been examined from 
a narrow perspective. This means that the oscillation 
of DPs from IDP to refugee, or returnee to once-again-
displaced returnee has not been addressed sufficient-
ly. In recent years, though, the issue of IDPs has 
gained considerable prominence (Cernea, 2000; Co-
hen, 2006; Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012). Still, the circle of 
scholars and practitioners focussing on this issue is 
still relatively small (Internal Displacement Monitor-
ing Centre, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015). Trans-
national and cross-border studies that focus on dy-
namical trans-regional processes are similarly very 
much en vogue (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szan-
ton-Blanc, 2013; Sökefeld, 2006; Vertovec, 2004). Here 
again, the number of in-depth studies on this issue is 
expanding slowly due to severe logistic and adminis-
trative constraints in IDP, refuge and return contexts. 
Both trans-statutory as well as cross-border studies 
are, in sum, just catching up slowly with the need to 
address pressing issues in everyday displacement 
projects.
This is particularly evident in regard to the num-
bers of undocumented DPs. The total number of un-
documented voluntary returnees and of locally inte-
grated persons is highly uncertain (Strand et al., 2008). 
The lack of a census or a profound estimation of ur-
ban and unregistered refugees, respectively IDPs, is 
also problematic because challenges linked to their 
presence cannot be addressed. Indeed, the numbers 
26 \  E.g. UNHCR’s Handbook on Voluntary Return, 1996, Geneva.
Frosh and Bangriwala in Afghanistan (Kuppers, 2014; 
Samuel Hall Consulting, 2011). They are often catego-
rised as different types of DPs at different stages of 
PFD and are framed in the simplistic origin–return 
logic. Yet their pre-DP existence might never have 
completely fitted statutory categories of belonging 
and homeland. In addition, there is hardly any ade-
quate analytical framework for stateless residents (e.g. 
Rohingya in Myanmar cf. Brinham, 2012; Kiragu, Rosi, 
& Morris, 2011; Lewa, 2001; Jogi in Afghanistan cf. 
Samuel Hall Consulting, 2011) in peace processes. Be-
cause of a lack of residence status, they are often ini-
tially neglected in programmes and are held in pro-
longed detention. Due to missing documents that 
prove their identity, they are particularly exposed to 
discrimination and large-scale human insecurity.
Another example for a problematic conceptual 
blurring of categories can be found in the definition 
of peace, the peace process, and sustainable reinte-
gration. We have highlighted above (cf. 3.2.) that a va-
riety of competing and overlapping perspectives exist 
in this regard and that these lead to different ap-
proaches and policy choices. When is peace sustaina-
ble? Can the often-observed renewed outbreak of con-
flict be integrated in investigations, definitions and 
efforts to understand the DP–return–peace nexus? Is 
it, on the contrary, necessary to exclude such consid-
eration in order to use/develop a neat conceptual ap-
proach? This question is crucial because depending 
on the answer to this question, some elements of 
conflict settings on the ground cannot be addressed. 
The distinction of humanitarian versus development 
programmes can be partly traced back to such defini-
tion issues that underlay narrow mandates of aid or-
ganisations and donors’ policies.
Displacement–peace nexus and peace processes
Phuong (2005, p. 1) concludes that there is “little 
academic literature analysing the impact of provi-
sions on forcible displacement in peace agreements.” 
The reviewed literature indicates that this state of 
the art has not improved over the last decade. In ad-
dition, Bradley (2013) points out that the “theoretical 
framework underpinning return remains compara-
tively undeveloped” and core concepts such as “digni-
fied return” remain underspecified (Bradley, 2013, p. 8). 
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Preventing unintended impacts 
Humanitarian rapid response programmes as 
well as development programmes face the risk of 
negative unintended consequences. In-depth-analy-
ses of a conflict-ridden area in the DRC, which is re-
garded a classical example of so-called tribalism and 
ethnic hate, shows that aid has indeed played a deci-
sive role in the culmination of violence. Development 
programmes in Masisi, DRC, had exacerbated ten-
sions between herders and farmers and thereby con-
tributed to inter-ethnic warfare (Jackson, 2009, p. 18). 
This shows that a detailed knowledge of the history 
and functioning of different realities (i.e. customary 
versus state laws) is a prerequisite to avoid doing 
harm (Anderson, 1999). Studies show that there is a 
significant impact of categorisations, and subsequent 
forms of assistance on affected DPs’ level of self-reli-
ance (Davies, 2012). In consequence, an in-depth un-
derstanding not only of the local context of PFD and 
the local social order but also an understanding of 
the generative effects of the interplay of the refugee 
regime—enacted by the different external and 
non-local stakeholders—is needed. Such an under-
standing will have to deal with questions of defini-
tions, but also with practices of the DP regime as well 
as return and reintegration policies. What is more, it 
points at the significance of donors’ worldviews and 
the question how they evaluate success or failure. 
The contrasting of different propositions might bear 
important insights for a reconciliation of views re-
garding long-term solutions and their implementa-
tion. What programmes or activities can foster sus-
tainable return? Does early reconciliation indeed 
help to reduce tensions between stayees and return-
ees as assumed by many policymakers? 
Comparing the role of DPs for peacebuilding 
Analysts stress that the perspective of DPs needs 
to be highlighted and taken up in policy development 
(cf. Krause, 2015). 28 For this purpose, sustainable PFD 
and peace policy studies would benefit from includ-
ing DP’s and other, particularly local stakeholders’ 
voices. It would give a clearer understanding of the 
28 \  „Public policies seeking to reverse forced migration seldom consult 
the actual victims of displacement, but this should be a key considera-
tion...“ (Stefanovic, Loizides and Parsons 2015, p. 289)..
of registered refugees and IDPs should be taken with 
a pinch of salt: There is no sufficient information on 
to what extent enumerators of DP groups—whether 
they be national, subnational governments or inter-
national agencies—follow their own agendas and 
how this shapes responses and policies (Kronenfeld, 
2008). 
Complex interrelations between  
displaced persons and peace
The overview of scholarly insights into return 
practices (cf. 5.1 and 5.2) as well as the identified gap 
of knowledge on the displacement–peace nexus illus-
trates the need for further research.27  The desk study 
points to the necessity to explore the viability of al-
ternative long-term solutions, such as local integra-
tion in the host country. Yet the major challenge is to 
decipher the interplay and the complex effects of the 
various intervening factors in peace and return 
processes. 
Against this background, this final section 
sketches interconnected focal areas for research and 
further inquiries that might help to answer the main 
research questions set out for this project in the in-
troduction: 1) What chances and risks can be ob-
served during the reintegration of refugees and IDPs? 
2) What makes reintegration sustainable and suc-
cessful? 3) Under which conditions does the partici-
pation of refugees and IDPs in peace processes play a 
key role in the sustainability of their return and 
peace? It should be recalled that peace processes, in 
our understanding, have to be analytically embedded 
into the social, political and economic context, and 
that it we assume that there are no clear-cut linear 
causalities but rather relationships between DPs/PFD 
and return/peace. 
27 \  The desk review suggests in particular that research on repatriation 
practices in PFD settings where different donors are in the lead, e.g. 
Uganda, Kenia, Sierra Leone, Liberia versus e.g. South Sudan, or Myan-
mar could substantiate the need for increased attention to how diffe-
rent government agencies coordinate or not. A comparative documen-
tation of the coordination processes and the interaction of all 
stakeholders thus would make sense. Lastly, longitudinal research that 
raises awareness about the non-linear development of settings that 
are labelled “post-conflict” and the often cyclical nature of peace-con-
flict-return-exile etc. should be prioritised.
PROTECTED RATHER THAN PROTRACTED
46 \ \ WORKING  PAPER 3  \ 2015
DPs.29  The qualifications that DPs have acquired in 
exile can again help to develop the country of origin 
once they have returned (even if this return is only 
temporary as e.g. in Afghanistan: cf. Kuschminder, 
2014). Moreover, attitudes DPs have acquired in exile, 
e.g. empowerment of women, expectations towards 
the government and understanding of the signifi-
cance of the rule of law, are important assets that 
could potentially be tapped in a more targeted way 
during peace processes. Against this background, the 
agency of DPs in respect to the rebuilding of liveli-
hoods and to peacebuilding deserves further research. 
A related field for further inquiry would be how to 
protect DPs’ and returnees’ access to rights, justice 
and land in the short and long term. 
Analysing livelihood-making
It has been pointed out that the prospects of suc-
cessfully establishing livelihoods in the return pro-
cess are crucial for DPs’ return decision. Although it 
is not easy to analyse how various factors that con-
tribute to conflict overlap, condition, or influence 
each other, a complete analysis of the DP’s prospec-
tive ability to benefit from livelihood resources such 
as land, water, and shelter, (that is access, ownership 
and user rights of resource and land) would be benefi-
cial for each situation of PFD and subsequent return 
programming. Mapping resource disputes is ex-
tremely useful in determining the operational scope 
and availability of dispute resolution mechanisms. In 
doing so, it seems promising to conduct the analysis 
by linking different levels, that is by including donors 
and implementing stakeholders. The refugee protec-
tion regime has commonly practiced repatriation 
with the aim that returnees rebuild livelihoods ex-
actly at their place of origin. In doing so, they neglect-
ed social dynamics during displacement such as the 
increasing family size, land capture by those who had 
stayed behind in the place of origin, land scarcity, 
29 \  „Preliminary research … suggests that the prolonged presence of refu-
gees and refugee assistance programmes can result in multiple bene-
fits for refugee-populated areas through increased employment oppor-
tunities for the local population, investment in local infrastructure, 
local market opportunities, provision of services for the local populati-
on, and availability of labour where refugees are allowed to work outsi-
de the camp“ (Milner and Loescher, 2011, p. 19).
preferences and aspirations of DPs on the one hand 
(e.g., local integration versus return) and the options 
they actually have in the PFD setting on the other. 
Comparative empirical research is needed to learn 
about the relationship between DPs and other stake-
holders in peace processes. While in-depth case stud-
ies will build the base to understand the micro-mech-
anisms, comparative research will help to make 
inferences on a larger scale. General open questions 
can be related to representation, i.e. who speaks for 
DPs, keeping in mind that they are not a homogene-
ous group but socially differentiated (with regard to 
age, gender, education, connectedness and alliances, 
wealth, access, etc.). It is hardly necessary to mention 
that the case specific social, political, and economic 
factors influencing preconditions for return (cf. 5.1) 
have to be studied as pointed out in the previous sec-
tion. This includes the above-mentioned focus on cy-
clical movements. The current situation has to be ex-
amined through a diachronic analysis that 
differentiates consequences of first, second, or multi-
ple displacements. Another set of questions relates to 
the actual negotiation process for peace in so-called 
post-conflict settings. Are DPs and their inclusion 
constrained by their assumed disadvantaged position 
as DPs versus a majority society in the host or home-
land or is it worth exploring negotiation theories to 
improve the prospects of success and sustainability 
of peace processes?
Investigating potentials of DPs
All too often, DPs are perceived as problematic, 
negative and a burden both for host communities/
countries and the international donor community (cf. 
Chapter 4), and their displacement experience is de-
picted as a hurdle for successful repatriation and re-
integration. Analysts have pointed out that little at-
tention has been paid to the positive impact of DPs in 
the destination sites (cf. Jacobsen, 2006; Kok, 1989; 
Zetter, 2012). It has been observed that the influx of 
DPs is an incentive for development, because the la-
bour market profits from qualified staff, the economy 
profits from innovations, diversification, and expan-
sion of trade that comes along with the influx of 
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transregional aspects. It has to include the host coun-
try and the country of origin as well as geopolitical 
dimensions. Sustainable projects have to consider 
positive impacts of hosting DP communities, such as 
economic growth, diversification of livelihoods, dy-
namical adaptation processes, and social develop-
ment, instead of managing and prolonging miserable 
conditions, crime, sexual and gender based violence, 
forced recruitment and general violence. The neces-
sary steps towards such an approach have to start 
low-key and are likely to rest on methodological con-
siderations in the first place in order to bear robust 
results. For example, research needs to highlight the 
necessity of sound analyses of risks and potentials for 
any measure, programme, or policy; thus, to conduct 
a comprehensive do-no-harm analysis to avoid cer-
tain, otherwise inevitable, shortfalls, such as neglect-
ing property restitution or amnesties for returnees, 
that have exacerbated grievances and tensions and 
have led to new violence (Bradley, 2013, p. 49). Analy-
ses that prioritise risks studies over speed of response 
might help identify and eventually prevent such un-
intended consequences. One has to bear in mind, 
however, that difficulties are always specific to the lo-
cal context and cannot be inferred at a general level.
losses through natural disasters, changed gender 
roles and changed lifestyles of DPs during the dis-
placement. As a result of such dynamics, many re-
turnees did not see any future in living in the place of 
origin/return. Research of how returnees find ways to 
generate income in the so-called post-conflict econo-
my can yield valuable insights and can contribute to 
a wider acknowledgement of particular needs and re-
spective programming/policies.  
Need to hear the voices of DPs 
Given the difficult situation in terms of categori-
sations, definitions, and an enumeration of different 
elements in the displacement–peace nexus (cf. 6.1), it 
is justified to scrutinise several aspects of the con-
temporary refugee regime and the return–peace nex-
us. The most obvious is the dominant assumption 
that repatriation or return is the best long-term solu-
tion for PFD. The lack of evidence pointed out so far 
and the finding that local voices have been severely 
disregarded in policymaking for DPs call for an inves-
tigation of the local integration option besides the fo-
cus on repatriation and return. In sum, we recom-
mend to develop a comprehensive displacement 
approach that addresses PFD situations encompass 
IDPs, refugees, persons in refugee or refugee-like situ-
ations, and hosts. We also believe that it is crucial to 
acknowledge that displacement, peacebuilding and 
violence in protracted conflict are re-occurring stag-
es of a vicious circle that will not be broken unless 
peace processes address root causes. A first step to un-
derstand how return and peace could be interlinked 
might be to include the voices of the displaced in fu-
ture analysis and to take a regional approach.
Benefit of a comprehensive and 
co-ordinated approach
Our last point ultimately leads back to the set of 
macro questions on how to achieve a more compre-
hensive approach towards successful return, integra-
tion and peace. This desk study has shown that it is 
necessary to address a wide range of issues in order to 
strengthen displaced persons in peace processes. 
Such an approach is required to include multidimen-
sional, multi-lateral, interinstitutional and 
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